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Another Limit on Federal Court Jurisdiction?
Immigrant Access to Class-Wide Injunctive Relief
Abstract
This article examines a statute that may embody another limit on the power of the
federal courts. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 (IIRIRA) implemented sweeping changes that substantially restrict federal court
review of administrative immigration decisions. One provision implemented as a part of
IIRIRA, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), appears, at least at first glance, to prohibit courts from
issuing class-wide injunctive relief in immigration cases. Such a restriction would be
significant because federal courts have issued class-wide injunctions in the past to stop
unconstitutional immigration practices and policies of the federal government. The
Supreme Court has not yet directly interpreted section 1252(f)(1). Taking a closer look at
the text of this provision in the context of relevant Supreme Court precedent, this article
suggests that the provision may not impose a broad bar against the use of class-wide
injunctive relief in the immigration context. In addition, if the Court interprets this
provision to broadly restrict class-wide injunctive relief, this article examines whether
habeas corpus jurisdiction may provide an alternative means to obtain such relief.
Ultimately, resolution of the effect of this provision will implicate the ongoing scholarly
debate over the constitutionality and propriety of congressional restrictions of federal
court review.
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I.

Introduction
Congressional attempts to limit federal court jurisdiction over controversial issues

are not innovative,1 and the scholarly debate addressing the constitutionality of such
attempts dates back many years.2 In the past, the scholarly debate anticipated future

1

For discussion of the history of congressional proposals to limit federal court review,

including proposals to limit federal court review in the areas of abortion, school prayer,
school bussing, immigration and prisoner’s rights, see Lloyd C. Anderson, Congressional
Control Over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: A New Threat to James Madison’s
Compromise, 39 BRANDEIS L.J.417, 427 (2000) [hereinafter Congressional Control];
Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An
Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895, 896-97 (1984);
Stephan O. Kline, Judicial Independence: Rebuffing Congressional Attacks on the Third
Branch, 87 KY. L.J.679, 738 -40 (1999).
2

See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal

Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); Lawrence Gene Sager,
Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to regulate the Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17 (1981); Laurence H. Tribe, Jurisdictional
Gerrymandering: Zoning Disfavored Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 129 (1981); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question:
An Essay on Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207
(1984) [hereinafter The Price of Asking]; Gunther, supra note 1; Akhil Reed Amar, A
Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65
B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985); Kline, supra note 1; Anderson, Congressional Control, supra,

1

possibilities.3 What if Congress eliminated Supreme Court review of certain claims?
What if Congress denied access to federal courts to a particular group? In the 1990’s, the
conditional nature of these questions diminished. One of the pieces of legislation that
cemented the practicality of such questions is the Illegal Immigration Reform and
note 1. For articles treating this issue by focusing on immigration issues, see Erwin
Chemerinsky, A Framework for Analyzing the Constitutionality of Restrictions on
Federal Court Jurisdiction in Immigration Cases, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 295 (1999); David
Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process as Limits on
Congress’s Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J.2481 (199 8) [hereinafter
Jurisdiction and Liberty]; Hart, supra; Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in
Congress and the Courts: Immigration and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615
(2000); M. Isabel Medina, Judicial Review—A Nice Thing? Article III, Separation of
Powers and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
29 CONN. L. REV. 1525 (1997); Gerald L. Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in Immigration
Law, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1661, 1882 n.125 (2000) [hereinafter Federal Courts Issues in
Immigration Law].
3

For example, the 1980’s wave of court-stripping scholarship evolved in response to

proposed legislation that aimed to limit federal court jurisdiction regarding controversial
issues such as abortion, school prayer and school bussing. None of these bills became
law. Anderson, Congressional Control, supra note 1, at 418. In 1984, Professor
Chemerinsky acknowledged the argument that “Congress, rarely, if ever, would use its
power to restrict federal court jurisdiction,” and prophetically wrote: “But it is not at all
certain that Congress would refrain from enacting such laws.” Chemerinsky, The Price
of Asking, supra note 2, at 1219-20.

2

Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996.4 IIRIRA contains many limits on court
review,5 and the federal courts are still grappling with the boundaries and meanings of its
restrictions.6
One restriction implemented through IIRIRA that the Supreme Court has yet to
directly interpret, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), may limit the ability of the federal courts to
grant class-wide injunctive relief in immigration cases. The exact meaning and effect of
4

Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208 (1996) (Division C).

Other examples include the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), through which Congress eliminated the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction
over certain habeas decisions of the courts of appeals. Pub. L. No. 104-132 (1996).
Also, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), which limited
a federal court’s ability to fashion relief in suits brought by prisoners. Omnibus
Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134 (1995)
(Title VIII). For a discussion of these laws in the context of the debate over
congressional control of federal court jurisdiction, see Anderson, Congressional Control,
supra note 1, at 435-44. Another timely (but not yet enacted) example of legislation
asserting Congressional control over federal court jurisdiction is a bill passed by the
House of Representatives that would limit federal court jurisdiction over legal questions
brought under the Defense of Marriage Act. H.R. 3313, 108th Congress (July 22, 2004).
5

IIRIRA attacks court review through three main fronts. First, IIRIRA contains

provisions that restrict the issues that a court may review. Second, IIRIRA contains
provisions that restrict the timing of an action. Third, the legislation also affects the
permissible form of an action challenging an administrative immigration adjudication.
6

See part III, infra.

3

the section, however, is uncertain. Analysis of this statutory section is important because
federal courts have issued class-wide injunctive relief in the past to stop unconstitutional
immigration policies and practices of the federal government. Because the power to
regulate immigration is a federal matter,7 if this statute bars the federal courts from
issuing class-wide injunctiverelief, no court would have the power to grant that relief.
By analyzing both the text of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1) and relevant Supreme Court
precedent, this article will attempt to decipher the meaning of section 1252(f)(1).8 This
article also considers whether habeas jurisdiction is a viable alternative method to obtain
class-wide injunctive relief if section 1252(f)(1) bars such relief.

II.

Previous Use of Immigration Class Actions

a.

To Begin, an Example
Faced with thousands of applications for benefits to adjudicate, how can a federal

agency with limited resources reduce its backlog? One strategy is to implement an
accelerated processing program and to discourage the filing of new applications. If the
agency spends less time adjudicating each application and intake slows, the backlog will
shrink. This strategy can cause extreme human consequences, however, if, for example,

7

See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) (“For reasons long recognized as valid,

the responsibility for regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien
visitors has been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government.”)
8

This article reserves the question of the constitutionality of the statute in favor of first

focusing on its meaning and effect.

4

the benefit sought is asylum based on an applicant’s fear of returning to their country of
origin.
The immigration service, 9 faced with a backlog of 6-7,000 asylum applications,
followed the above approach and implemented an accelerated processing program to
dispense with the backlog.10 Immigration judges, administrative judges who preside over
immigration hearings, held approximately 18 individual hearings per day.11 Immigration

9

Prior to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003, the Immigration

and Naturalization Service (INS), located within the Department of Justice, administered
the immigration laws of the United States. With the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security, the functions of the INS were broken up into new organizations. The
United States Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), which administers benefit
programs, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which controls enforcement
and detention issues, and United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) are new
separate entities that reside within the Department of Homeland Security. Control over
the administrative appeal process remains within the Department of Justice. See
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 (2002). For simplicity, this article
will use the term “immigration service” to generally refer to the entities that administer
the immigration laws.
10

Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1029-31 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982).

11

Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1031. Under the accelerating processing

program, the Miami district office of the immigration service processed asylum
applications “at an unprecedented rate.” Id. at 1031.

5

judges afforded applicants ten days to compile and file a written claim for asylum.12 The
immigration service conducted asylum interviews at a rate of forty per day and limited
each interview to one-half hour.13 At the rate of forty interviews per day, there was a
shortage of attorneys available to represent the applicants who desired counsel.14 During
the accelerated program, the immigration service granted asylum to not one applicant.15
In response to a class action lawsuit filed challenging the accelerated processing
program, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith,
concluded that the program deprived its applicants of due process of law.16 The court
affirmed the district court’s class-wide injunction to the extent it ordered the immigration
service to re-process the applications in a manner consistent with due process.17

12

Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1031. The district court determined that the

preparation of one asylum application required between ten to forty hours of attorney
work time. Id. at 1032. Given the number of applicants desiring counsel and the number
of available attorneys, the district court determined that a ten-day time frame was
impossible. Id. at 1031-32.
13

Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1031.

14

Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1031. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit concluded that the immigration service “had knowingly made it impossible for
[applicants] and their attorneys to prepare and file asylum applications in a timely
manner.” Id. at 1031-32.
15

Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1032.

16

Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1040.

17

Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d at 1041.

6

What if the federal courts had no power to issue such class-wide relief? This
question is not hypothetical, as access to class-wide injunctive relief in the immigration
context is uncertain after the enactment of IIRIRA.
b.

Why a Class Action?
Class action lawsuits filed against the immigration service over time have

presented serious objections to the immigration service’s administration of the
immigration laws.18 As in Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, immigration class action
litigation seeks to change a pattern of agency behavior, whether nationwide or across an
administrative region. Immigration class actions of the past can be grouped into three
major categories. The first major group is those actions challenging the fact of or
conditions attached to immigration detention,19 including the treatment of detained

18

It is beyond the scope of this article to judge the behavior of the immigration service, or

to investigate the reasons behind its alleged deficiencies. Also, while these class actions
have presented serious objections to immigration service practices and procedures, not all
of these cases have found success on their merits.
19

The immigration service has the power to detain many classes of foreign nationals, and

the power to detain is not restricted to foreign nationals who have committed crimes.
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (mandating detention of a broad class of foreign
nationals); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (authorizing detention of a foreign national pending a
removal decision). This is important to understand, given that immigration detention
often means incarceration in a state or federal prison.

7

juveniles and adults.20 The second major group is those actions challenging the manner
in which the immigration service implements immigration benefit programs demanded by
Congress,21 including the asylum program. 22 The third major category is composed of
20

See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993) (addressing class action challenging the

detention of juveniles, the Supreme Court determined that the immigration service had
not violated due process standards); Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 02-CV-2307, 2004 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 14537 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2004) (addressing discovery issues in a class action
challenging post-September 11 detention of foreign nationals); Kazarov v. Achim, No.
02-C-5097, 2003 WL 22956006 (N.D. Ill. December 12, 2003) (certifying class
challenging detention of those ordered but not yet removed from the United States);
Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 91 F.R.D. 117 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (certifying class challenging
detention of Mariel Cubans). Also, in 2002, a class action lawsuit was filed challenging
the immigration service’s detention of foreign nationals subject to a special registration
program that required registration at immigration service offices within the United States.
See Elaine Monaghan, Muslims Sue US Over Mass Arrests, THE TIMES (London),
December 26, 2002.
21

See, e.g., McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991) (determining that

statute restricting judicial review of agency legalization determinations did not bar class
action challenges to the administration of the 1986 legalization program); Ngwanyia v.
Ashcroft, 302 F. Supp.2d 1076 (D. Minn. 2004) (granting partial summary judgment to
class challenging immigration service procedures in adjudicating permanent residence
applications of those granted asylum and also challenging the procedures used in issuing
documentation of work authorization to those granted asylum); Campos v. INS, 32 F.
Supp.2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (denying, in part, the government’s motion to dismiss a

8

objections to the immigration service’s procedures in removing23 foreign nationals from
the United States, including practices used to obtain waivers of the right to a hearing,24
class action complaint challenging naturalization procedures); Phillips v. Brock, 652 F.
Supp. 1372 (D. Md. 1987), vacated as moot sub nom., Phillips v. McLaughlin, 854 F.2d
673 (4th Cir. 1988) (certifying class contesting administrative rulings regarding the
employment of foreign workers but granting summary judgment to the government).
22

See, e.g., Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1992) (ordering

district court to dismiss class action complaint challenging interdiction at sea
procedures); Haitian Refugee Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982)
(affirming district court’s class-wide injunction to the extent it ordered the immigration
service to reprocess asylum applications); American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh,
760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (approving settlement agreement between class of
Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum seekers and the government); Orantes-Hernandez v.
Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (certifying provisional class of Salvadorans
challenging asylum practices).
23

Over time, federal immigration statutes have used different terminology to reflect the

concepts of expulsion of a foreign national from inside the United States and of refusal to
allow entry of a foreign national into the United States. IIRIRA concluded official use of
the two terms deportation (referring to the act of expulsion from) and exclusion (referring
to the act of refusing admittance) and replaced the two concepts with an umbrella concept
called “removal.”
24

See, e.g., Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming certification of

class challenging the immigration service’s procedures in obtaining waivers and also
affirming that those procedures violated notions of due process); Perez-Funez v.

9

the stop and seizure practices of the United States Border Patrol,25 practices used in
immigration workplace enforcement raids26 and the immigration service’s alleged
unauthorized use of confidential information.27
Scholars have discussed why class actions are preferable to individual actions to
challenge these types of immigration service practices.28 An advantage of the class
action device is that it allows for broad systematic reform.29 Due to its potentially broad
INS, 611 F. Supp. 990 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (certifying class and granting preliminary
injunction to class challenging the immigration service practice of obtaining waiver of a
right to a hearing from unaccompanied minor foreign nationals).
25

See, e.g., Murillo v. Musegades, 809 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Tex. 1992).

26

See, e.g., International Molders’ and Allied Workers’ Local Union No. 164 v. Nelson,

102 F.R.D. 457 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
27

See, e.g., Aparicio v. Blakeway, 302 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2002).

28

See Leti Volpp, Court-Stripping and Class-Wide Relief: A Response to Judicial Review

in Immigration Cases After AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 463, 469-71 (2000) [hereinafter
Court-Stripping and Class-Wide Relief]; Gerald L. Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in
Immigration Law, supra note 2, at 1680-81; Robert Pauw, Judicial Review of “Pattern
and Practice” Cases: What to Do When the INS Acts Unlawfully, 70 WASH. L. REV.
779, 790-98 (1995); and Jack Greenberg, Civil Rights Class Actions: Procedural Means
of Obtaining Substance, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 575, 576 (1997).
29

See Gerald L. Neuman, Federal Courts Issues, supra note 2, at 1681 (explaining

“[w]hen classwide litigation leads to reform of systemic practices, the benefits may be
shared with unrepresented aliens; when counsel prevails at the district court level in an
individual case, [the immigration service] can yield for the occasion without acquiescing

10

nature, a class action can give relief to individuals who otherwise might not realize they
are entitled to relief.30 The government does not provide free counsel if a foreign
national facing removal cannot afford to hire their own.31 This fact, combined with the
enormous complexity of immigration law, means that many foreign nationals with valid
challenges to the practices of the immigration service may never be able to articulate
those claims; they may never even realize that their claims exist.32 A further advantage
of using the class action device in the immigration context, and one that will be discussed
below, is that it may be impossible to develop an adequate record to establish an unlawful
agency pattern or practice through the adjudication of an individual immigration
proceeding.33

in the legal principle more generally”). Even if a claim is heard in an individual
proceeding and a judgment against a practice of the immigration service is obtained, it is
doubtful that this judgment would be of much value to other foreign nationals, given the
restrictions presented by the doctrine of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel and the
expense of bringing hundreds or thousands of lawsuits addressing the same legal issue.
See Greenberg, supra note 28, at 578.
30

See Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in Immigration Law, supra note 2, at 1680-81.

31

8 U.S.C. § 1362 (“In any removal proceedings . . . the person concerned shall have the

privilege of being represented (at no expense to the Government) by such counsel . . . as
he shall choose”).
32

See Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in Immigration Law, supra note 2, at 1680-81.

33

See notes 47-49, infra. For example, in Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, the district

court was able to effectively and efficiently gather necessary information about the

11

c.

The 1986 Legalization Cases
Perhaps the best-known (and longest lasting) immigration class action lawsuits

were filed in the wake of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).
These cases are examples of class litigation challenging the immigration service’s
administration of a benefit program. More importantly for the purpose of this article, the
Supreme Court’s treatment of the review-limiting provisions of the legalization statute
provide perspective on deciphering the meaning of the text of section 1252(f)(1) (created
by IIRIRA, the 1996 act), which is also a review-limiting provision.
Through IRCA, Congress created a program that allowed certain foreign nationals
illegally present in the United States to legalize their immigration status.34 The
legalization program had two main components. The first component granted the

accelerated processing program by analyzing the program as a whole, beyond the
treatment of a single applicant.
34

Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603 (1986). In January

2004, President George W. Bush initiated a policy discussion regarding the construction
of a new temporary worker program with a legalization component. Remarks by the
President, President Bush Proposes New Temporary Worker Program (January 7, 2004),
available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040107-3.html. When
framing any new legalization program, it is important to review the immigration service’s
implementation of the 1986 legalization program and also the subsequent legal
challenges.

12

opportunity to apply for permanent residence status35 to foreign nationals who had
entered the United States before January 1, 1982 and who had illegally and continuously
resided in the United States since that date.36 The second component applied to foreign
national agricultural workers who had resided in the United States for at least one year
prior to May 1, 1986 and who had also performed at least 90 days of qualifying
agricultural work during that same period.37 Agricultural workers who qualified under
the second component were deemed “special agricultural workers” (SAW) and also were
permitted to apply for permanent residence.
Several class action lawsuits were filed challenging the immigration service’s
administration of the 1986 legalization program.38 In general, these lawsuits claimed that

35

More commonly known as “green card” status, permanent residents are not citizens of

the United States, but hold more privileges than other foreign nationals in the United
States, including unrestricted employment authorization and potentially infinite
permission to reside in the United States. For further discussion on the incidences of
permanent resident status in the United States, see CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY
MAILMAN AND STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §§6.03, 6.05.
36

8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(A).

37

8 U.S.C. § 1160(a)(1)(B).

38

See, e.g., Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. 43 (1993); McNary v. Haitian

Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479 (1991); Aparicio v. Blakeway, 302 F.3d 437 (5th Cir.
2002); Immigrant Assistance Project of the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor v.
INS, 306 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2002); Ortiz v. Meissner, 179 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 1999);
Proyecto San Pablo v. INS, 189 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 1999); Abdullah v. INS, 184 F.3d

13

the immigration service, in administering the legalization program, excluded individuals
from the program whom Congress intended to include. The stakes were high, as the
difference between inclusion and exclusion was permission to legally reside in the United
States.
The Supreme Court ultimately addressed whether federal district courts even had
jurisdiction over the legalization class action complaints. McNary v. Haitian Refugee
Center, Inc. and Catholic Social Services, Inc. v. Reno, both class actions, now provide
the structure for determining whether a federal district court has jurisdiction over a
challenge to the administration of the 1986 legalization program.
Under the general immigration judicial review statute that existed at the time of
IRCA (the 1986 act), foreign nationals subject to deportation could only obtain judicial
review of a final deportation order directly in the appropriate federal court of appeals.
Case law existed, however, that allowed district courts to hear certain claims deemed
related yet collateral to a “final order” outside of the direct court of appeals review
process.39 Some courts of appeals had allowed district courts to hear challenges to
immigration service practices even before the issuance of a final order.40

158 (2d Cir. 1999); Naranjo-Aguilera v. USINS, 30 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 1994); Ayuda,
Inc. v. Reno, 7 F.3d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
39

See, e.g., Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206 (1968).

40

See, e.g., National Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc. v. INS, 913 F.2d 1350, 1352 (9th

Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 502 U.S. 183 (1991); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957,
979-80 (11th Cir. 1984), aff’d on other grounds, 472 U.S. 846 (1985); Haitian Refugee
Ctr. v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1033 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982); but see Ayuda, Inc. v.

14

The jurisdictional debate surrounding the 1986 legalization statute stemmed from
the identical special judicial review provisions applicable to both the long-term residence
and SAW programs, which operated on top of the existing general rules regarding
judicial review of immigration administrative actions. The special provisions both state
that “[t]here shall be no administrative or judicial review of a determination respecting an
application for adjustment of status [to permanent resident] under this section [the
legalization program] except in accordance with this subsection.”41 Additionally, the
sections provide that review of a denial under either legalization program is available
only “in the judicial review of an order of deportation,” and that “[s]uch judicial review

Thornburgh, 880 F.2d 1325, 1336 (D.C. Cir 1989) (criticizing Haitian Refugee Center v.
Smith). For further information on the pre-1996 immigration judicial review process, see
Hiroshi Motomura, Judicial Review in Immigration Cases After AADC: Lessons from
Civil Procedure, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 385, 415-17 (2000) [hereinafter Judicial Review
in Immigration Cases After AADC] (discussing the historic practice of allowing non-final
order review of collateral matters). See also Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future:
Congress Attacks the Right to Judicial Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L.
REV. 1411, 1431-34 (1997) [hereinafter Back to the Future]; Pauw, supra note 28, at 77980.
41

8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(1) (long-term residence program); 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)(1) (SAW

program).
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shall be based solely upon the administrative record established at the time of the review
by the appellate [administrative] authority.”42
In McNary, the Supreme Court determined that the special judicial review
provisions quoted above did not preclude federal district court jurisdiction “over an
action alleging a pattern or practice of procedural due process violations by [the
immigration service] in its administration of the SAW program.”43
42

8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(4)(A)-(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)(3)(A)-(B) (the SAW provision reads

“in the judicial review of an order of exclusion or [emphasis added] deportation;” the
long-term residence equivalent does not mention “exclusion” but is otherwise the same).
43

McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 483 (1991). Because applicants

would face deportation if not for the legalization program, the legalization statute
shielded applicants with a firewall prohibiting the use of information garnered in the
application process to deport the applicant. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(C)(5); 8 U.S.C. §
1160(b)(6). A decision to deny a legalization application could be administratively
appealed to a legalization appeals unit. 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(f)(3); 8 U.S.C. § 1160(e)(2)(A).
Because of the firewall, however, a legalization appeals unit denial did not automatically
place an individual in deportation proceedings. This protection presented a Catch-22 to
individuals who desired federal court review of a legalization appeals unit denial. As
explained above, the legalization special review provision permitted judicial review of a
decision of the legalization appeals unit “only in the judicial review of an order of
deportation.” As explained by the Supreme Court, “absent initiation of a deportation
proceeding against an unsuccessful applicant, judicial review of such individual
determinations was completely foreclosed.” McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498
U.S. at 486.

16

The McNary plaintiffs represented a class of foreign national agricultural workers
“who either had been or would be injured by unlawful practices and policies adopted by
[the immigration service] in its administration of the SAW program.”44 Among other
specific challenges, the plaintiff class claimed that the immigration service refused SAW
applicants opportunities to challenge adverse evidence and to present witnesses, that the
immigration service did not provide effective translators and that adequate transcripts of
legalization interviews did not exist, thus inhibiting the effectiveness of administrative
review. The government argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the class
action complaint because the legalization special judicial review scheme allows for
judicial review only to individuals after the conclusion of an individual hearing in a court
of appeals.45
To the contrary, the Supreme Court held that the district court did have
jurisdiction over the class action complaint. The Supreme Court interpreted the
legalization judicial review scheme to only apply to “determination[s] respecting an
application.” The Court determined that the McNary class was not challenging “a
determination respecting an application,” but was instead making “general collateral
challenges to unconstitutional practices and policies used by the agency in processing
applications.”46 Because of the nature of the challenge, the case fell outside of the special
legalization judicial review structure, and district court jurisdiction was appropriate.

44

McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. at 487.

45

McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. at 491.

46

McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. at 492.
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The Court concluded that to deny district court review of pattern and practice
collateral challenges would be the “practical equivalent of a total denial of judicial review
of generic constitutional and statutory claims.”47 Even if a foreign national subjected
themselves to a deportation proceeding, and then sought judicial review, the Court
concluded the reviewing court of appeals would be in a poor position to adjudicate
constitutional pattern and practice claims based on the administrative record of an
individual legalization application.48 The Court doubted that a court of appeals would
have adequate fact-finding powers to determine whether a pattern of unlawful practice
was occurring in the context of an individual case.49 The Supreme Court also reasoned
that if Congress had intended the legalization special judicial review provision to apply
beyond appeal of individual determinations to pattern and practice litigation, Congress
could have used broader statutory language to clearly express that intent.50
The significance of McNary became muddled, however, with the Supreme
Court’s decision in Reno v. Catholic Social Services. Decided two and a half years after

47

McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. at 497.

48

McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. at 497. See also Tefel v. Reno, 972 F.

Supp. 608, 615 (S.D. Fla. 1997), vacated on other grounds, 180 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir.
1999) (following McNary, the court discussed the need for district court review of claims
for which an adequate record is not created during the administrative process).
49

McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. at 497.

50

McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. at 494. The Supreme Court provided

an example of such broader language, stating that Congress could have worded the statute
to block judicial review of “all causes” relating to the legalization program.
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McNary, Catholic Social Services concerned the long-term illegal resident component of
the 1986 legalization program. To be eligible for the program, Congress required several
conditions be met. The applicant must have entered the United States before January 1,
1982 and also must prove illegal continuous residence in the United States since at least
that date.51 The applicant must also show continuous physical presence in the United
States since November 6, 1986.52 The foreign national must have also submitted a
legalization application during a one-year application period.53
The legalization statute elaborates that “brief, casual, and innocent” absences are
permissible under the continuous physical presence requirement.54 The immigration
service, however, regulated that such brief, casual and innocent absences would bar the
establishment of continuous physical presence if the individual had not obtained travel
permission from the immigration service prior to travel.55 Regarding the illegal
continuous residence requirement, the immigration service regulated that that
requirement would not be satisfied if the foreign national had left the United States and
re-entered by presenting “facially valid” documentation, despite that the statute allowed
for brief trips abroad.56 To further complicate matters, the immigration service reversed
its interpretation of the illegal continuous residence requirement seven months into the

51

8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(A).

52

8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3)(A).

53

8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(1)(A).

54

8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3)(B).

55

Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 47 (1993) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1(g)).

56

Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc. 509 U.S. at 50; 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(g)(2)(A).
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one-year application period.57 In both lawsuits that were consolidated into Catholic
Social Services, a district court judge invalidated the immigration service’s interpretation
of the statutory terms and extended the one-year filing period to allow for applications by
those discouraged by the immigration service’s interpretations of the statutory terms at
issue.
On appeal, the government argued that the district court did not have jurisdiction
due to the legalization program’s special judicial review scheme. According to the
government, the immigration service’s interpretations of the illegal continuous residence
and continuous physical presence requirements amounted to “determinations respecting
an application” and were thus reviewable only during an individual hearing. In response
to this argument, the Supreme Court reemphasized that the statutory phrase “a
determination” refers to a single act, not a group of decisions or a practice or procedure
employed in making decisions.58 In this sense, the Court reaffirmed McNary by
reiterating that the special legalization judicial review provision does not bar district court
review of collateral pattern and practice challenges, including actions challenging the
legality of a regulation implementing the legalization statute. 59
From there, however, the Supreme Court’s decision in Catholic Social Services
diverges from McNary. The Supreme Court held that while the legalization statute itself
would not serve as a jurisdictional bar, the Catholic Social Services classes could not
meet the ripeness justiciability standard required of all those seeking federal court review.

57

Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc. 509 U.S. at 50-51.

58

Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 55-6 (1993).

59

Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. at 56.
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The Court determined that the immigration service’s publication of its illegal continuous
residence and continuous physical presence interpretations alone did not create a ripe
claim. The Court explained that the “claim would ripen only once [an applicant] took the
affirmative steps that he could take before the INS blocked his path by applying the
regulation to him.”60 Without those first affirmative steps, the Court reasoned, “one
cannot know whether the challenged regulation actually makes a concrete difference to a
particular alien until one knows that he will take those affirmative steps and will satisfy
the other conditions.”61
However, the Court elaborated that if a challenged regulatory interpretation is
detrimentally applied to an applicant and the applicant asserts their ripe claim, the
applicant would be challenging “a determination.” Thus, the special judicial review
provision is triggered and district court review is precluded. The Court explained that
“Congress may well have assumed that, in the ordinary case, the courts would not hear a
challenge to regulations specifying limits to eligibility before those regulations were
actually applied to an individual, whose challenge to the denial of an individual
application would proceed within the Reform Act’s limited scheme.”62 The Catholic
Social Services class is different from the McNary class, the Court reasoned, because a
Catholic Social Services class member could challenge the immigration service’s
interpretation of the statutory terms in an individual deportation hearing, while a McNary

60

Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. at 59.

61

Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. at 59 n.20.

62

Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. at 60.
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class member could not adequately present their pattern or practice challenge in the
context of an individual hearing.63
The Supreme Court left open the possibility of district court review, however, for
Catholic Social Services class members subject to an alleged “front-desking” policy. The
immigration service instructed front desk clerks to review applications in the presence of
the applicant. If the clerk determined based on a facial review that the applicant is
ineligible under the legalization statute, the instructions directed the clerk to refuse the
application for filing and return it immediately to the applicant.64 Applicants subjected to
this “front-desking” procedure held ripe claims because “front-desked” applicants would
have felt the application of the challenged regulations “in a particularly concrete
manner.”65 The “front-desked” applicant would also face a McNary-like deprivation of
judicial review, according to the Court. Because “front-desking” amounted only to an
informal denial, the applicant could not file an administrative appeal. Therefore, the
Court reasoned, blocking district court review of applications refused at the front desk
would effectively leave those applicants with no meaningful review.66 In Catholic Social
Services, the Court left open the possibility that “front-desked” applicants could maintain
a class action in a district court.67

63

Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. at 60-61.

64

Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. at 61-62.

65

Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. at 63-64.

66

Reno v. Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc., 509 U.S. at 64.

67

Section 377 of IIRIRA (the 1996 act) limited jurisdiction of claims brought under the

1986 legalization act to those brought by individuals who had actually filed or had
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Lower courts, in applying McNary and Catholic Social Services, have considered
whether review would be available if it is not permitted in a district court.68 Lower courts
have also emphasized the distinction between review of a challenge to “a determination”
and review of a challenge to a widely employed practice or procedure.69

attempted to file applications, leaving those who had not even attempted to file
applications (discouraged by stories of those subjected to “front-desking”) outside of the
circle of jurisdiction. However, the Legal Immigration Family Equity Act (LIFE Act) of
2000 repealed section 377 of IIRIRA with regard to certain legalization class members.
Pub. L. No. 106-553, § 1104 (2000) (Title XI).
68

See, e.g., Yi v. Maugans, 24 F.3d 500, 505 (3d Cir. 1994) (affirming denial of class

certification, among other reasons, where denial “would not foreclose all forms of
meaningful judicial review”).
69

For example, the Ninth Circuit deduced two guiding principles from McNary and

Catholic Social Services. The first principle is that a district court can review a
legalization procedure or practice of the immigration service, collateral to substantive
adjudication, provided that the claim is ripe. The second is that challenges to the
immigration service’s interpretation or application of substantive criteria may only occur
within the confines of the legalization program’s special judicial review structure (only
during review of a final order of deportation). Proyecto San Pablo v. INS, 189 F.3d
1130, 1137 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Ortiz v. Meissner, 179 F.3d 718, 720-23 (9th Cir.
1999)). For other lower court decisions applying McNary and Catholic Social Services,
see, for example, Aparicio v. Blakeway, 302 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2002); Immigrant
Assistance Project of the Los Angeles County of Labor v. INS, 306 F.3d 842 (9th Cir.
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Still relying on the framework of McNary and Catholic Social Services, some of
the class action cases challenging the administration of the 1986 legalization program
settled in 2004. For example, on January 21, 2004, a district court entered an order
approving a settlement between the Catholic Social Servicestravel permission class
(challenging the continuous residence requirement) and the immigration service.70
According to the agreement, the immigration service will provide a new one-year
application period for those individuals who appeared to apply for legalization but were
told that they were ineligible because they had traveled abroad without obtaining advance
permission from the immigration service.71
The special judicial review provisions of the legalization program represented a
big challenge to the availability of class-wide relief in the immigration context. Both
McNary and Catholic Social Services are important lessons in the Supreme Court’s
review of immigration statutes potentially limiting the form of a federal court action.
McNary and Catholic Social Services, however, concerned “special” judicial review
statutes that were aberrations from the norm. As explained above, at the time of McNary,
courts had held that the “regular” judicial review scheme underlying the “special” judicial

2002); Abdullah v. INS, 184 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 1999); Naranjo-Aguilera v. U. S. INS, 30
F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 1994); Ayuda, Inc. v., Reno, 7 F.3d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
70

Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc. v. Ridge, No. S-86-1343 (E.D. Ca. January 23, 2004) (Order

Approving Settlement of Class Action).
71

Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc. v. Ridge, No. S-86-1343 (E.D. Ca. January 23, 2004) (Joint

Stipulation Regarding Settlement at ¶ 4, attached to Order Approving Settlement of Class
Action).
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review scheme of the legalization program allowed for pattern and practice class action
challenges in a district court before the issuance of an administrative final order. IIRIRA,
the 1996 law, presents an even bigger challenge, because IIRIRA fundamentally changed
the underlying review scheme. IIRIRA raises the question whether the “regular” system
still allows for class-wide injunctive relief in the immigration context.

III.

Major Review-Limiting Provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
As described by many commentators, the Illegal Immigration Reform and

Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) drastically remodeled the Immigration
and Nationality Act.72 A major theme of IIRIRA is the curtailment of court review of
administrative action in enforcing the immigration laws. IIRIRA transformed the
Immigration and Nationality Act by deleting the existing review provisions and adding
section 1252, “Judicial review of orders of removal.” Because IIRIRA is so complex,
and its review-limiting provisions are interrelated, it is necessary to describe IIRIRA’s
major restrictions and the Supreme Court’s treatment of these restrictions so far before
any discussion of a specific provision of IIRIRA.

72

See, e.g., Lenni B. Benson, The New World of Judicial Review of Removal Orders, 12

GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 233 (1988); Benson, Back to the Future, supra note 40; Lucas
Guttentag, The Immigration Act: Federal Court Jurisdiction-Statutory Restrictions and
Constitutional Rights, 1209 PLI/CORP 81, 81-98 (2000).
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Section 1252 carves out a wide selection of substantive matters not subject to
judicial review. These matters include a decision to execute expedited removal73 against
a foreign national,74 certain decisions involving discretionary acts of government
officials75 and decisions to remove foreign nationals convicted of committing certain
73

Expedited removal is a concept added to the Immigration and Nationality Act by

IIRIRA. Expedited removal permits border officers to enforce the immediate removal of
certain individuals. If a border officer determines that a foreign national is inadmissible
into the United States due to fraud or due to a lack of appropriate documentation, the
officer can order the removal of the individual “without further hearing or review.” 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). The border officer cannot order expedited removal, however,
if the individual expresses intent to apply for asylum or expresses fear of persecution, and
the border officer determines that the individual possesses a credible fear of persecution.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I). The applicant may seek
administrative review of an adverse credible fear determination, but the individual is
detained while awaiting this administrative review. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III)(IV). For more information about the expedited removal process, see CHARLES GORDON,
STANLEY MAILMAN AND STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §
64.06.
74

8 U.S.C. § 1252(e).

75

According to IIRIRA, “no court shall have jurisdiction to review” any decision whether

to grant a waiver of statutory provisions demanding removal of certain foreign nationals
with criminal histories, any decision whether to grant cancellation of removal, any
decision whether to grant voluntary departure or any decision whether to adjust an
individual’s status to legal permanent residence. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).
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crimes.76 A further substantive restriction on review contained in IIRIRA is section
1252(g), which provides: “Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any
other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or
on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien
under this chapter.”
In addition to substantive restrictions, section 1252 contains a timing restriction.
Section 1252(b)(9), entitled “Consolidation of questions for judicial review,” states:
“Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application
of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding

Additionally, IIRIRA prevents judicial review of “any other decision or action of the
Attorney General the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the
discretion of the Attorney General other than the granting of relief under section 1158(a)
of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Section 1158(a) refers to a decision whether
to grant asylum.
76

IIRIRA prohibits judicial review of a final removal order based on the commission of a

crime of moral turpitude, an aggravated felony or a controlled substance crime, among
other crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C). For further information on criminal bases for
removal, including what constitutes a crime of moral turpitude and an aggravated felony,
see CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN AND STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION
LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 63.03, 71.05.
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brought to remove an alien from the United States under this subchapter shall be
available only in judicial review of a final order under this section.”77
There are two form-restricting provisions in section 1252 that may affect the use
of multi-party litigation. Regarding expedited removal, IIRIRA provides that “no court
may -- certify a class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” in any of the
narrow instances where the statute permits judicial review of expedited removal issues.78

77

This provision is reminiscent of the “special” judicial review provision in McNary, and

also implicates the use of pattern and practice litigation. In fact, Professor Motomura has
compared McNary to section 1252(b)(9). Judicial Review in Immigration Cases After
AADC, supra note 40, at 434-38. He argues that the reasoning of McNary survives
section 1252(b)(9) and that section 1252(b)(9) should be narrowly construed to allow for
district court jurisdiction over pre-final order pattern and practice litigation. Judicial
Review After AADC, supra note 40, at 434-38. A further potential challenge to pattern
and practice litigation is section 1252(d), which requires exhaustion of administrative
remedies before a court may review a “final order” of removal. Professor Motomura
argues that the exhaustion requirement should not apply to pattern and practice litigation
because such matters are independent from a “final order” of removal. Judicial Review
in Immigration Cases After AADC, supra note 40, at 440-41.
78

8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1)(B). IIRIRA provides for extremely limited habeas corpus review

of expedited removal decisions, and IIRIRA allowed for judicial review of the
constitutionality of the expedited removal program only in the District Court for the
District of Columbia and only if the lawsuit challenging the program was filed no later
than 60 days after the program was first implemented. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3).
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The second form-restricting provision is 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), which is entitled “Limit
on injunctive relief.” The section reads:
(1)

In general

Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of the identity of the party or
parties bringing the action, no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have
jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of
part IV of this subchapter,79 as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, other than with respect to the
application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom
proceedings under such part have been initiated.
Over eight years since the passage of IIRIRA, federal courts are still debating the
meaning and effect of many of its review-limiting provisions. The Supreme Court has
directly addressed two major review-limiting issues, but the Court has not yet directly
addressed the effect of the timing provision (section 1252(b)(9)) or the form-limiting
section 1252(f)(1).
The Supreme Court first considered section 1252(g). In Reno v. American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee,80 a group of Palestinians brought a selective prosecution

79

“Part IV of this subchapter” refers to the part entitled “Inspection, Apprehension,

Examination, Exclusion, and Removal,” and is comprised of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1231.
80

Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999). For in-

depth discussion of this litigation and issues raised in this case, see, for example, David
Martin, On Counterintuitive Consequences and Choosing the Right Control Group: A
Defense of Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 363 (2000); Motomura, Judicial Review
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claim against the immigration service. The Court adopted a narrow interpretation of
section 1252(g), determining that it restricts review of only three discrete actions, the
decision or action to (1) commence proceedings; (2) adjudicate cases; or (3) execute
removal orders.81 Rejecting the immigration service’s argument that 1252(g) applies to
“the universe of deportation claims,” the Court explained that 1252(g) would bar only a
pre-final order82 challenge to the immigration service’s exercise of discretion with respect
to the three discrete acts mentioned in the statute.83 The Court determined that federal

in Immigration Cases After AADC, supra note 40, at 393-95; Gerald L. Neuman,
Terrorism, Selective Deportation and the First Amendment after Reno v. AADC, 14 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 313 (2000). For discussion of the role of this Supreme Court decision in the
ongoing debate over congressional control of federal court jurisdiction, see Anderson,
Congressional Control, supra note 1, at 436-37.
81

Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 482.

82

Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 483. Section 1252(g)

prevents review of those three acts “[e]xcept as provided in this section.” Theoretically,
if a foreign national is eligible for judicial review under section 1252, a court would have
jurisdiction over a claim challenging any of the three acts mentioned in section 1252(g)
when reviewing a final order pursuant to section 1252. The plaintiffs in American-Arab
were seeking pre-final order review in a district court.
83

Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 482.
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courts lack pre-final order jurisdiction over selective prosecution claims as the claim
involves the discrete act whether to commence proceedings.84
In 2001, the Supreme Court addressed whether IIRIRA’s review-limiting
provisions foreclosed habeas corpus actions in the federal district courts. INS v. St. Cyr85
concerned a habeas petition challenging the retroactive application of IIRIRA’s
elimination of a type of deportation waiver. Mr. St. Cyr pled guilty to a deportable crime
before IIRIRA’s enactment, during the existence of a waiver that would have allowed
him to remain in the United States despite his plea. IIRIRA eliminated the waiver for
which Mr. St. Cyr would have been eligible.86
The immigration service argued in St. Cyr that no federal court had jurisdiction to
consider Mr. St. Cyr’s claim that the pre-IIRIRA waiver should apply to him. The
Supreme Court concluded that if it accepted the immigration service’s argument,
individuals like Mr. St. Cyr would be left without any judicial forum to bring challenges
consisting of pure questions of law. The Court determined that “the absence of such a
forum, coupled with the lack of a clear, unambiguous, and express statement of
congressional intent to preclude judicial consideration on habeas of such an important
question of law, strongly counsels against adopting a construction that would raise
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Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 487. The Court

determined that the doctrine of constitutional doubt played no role in the case before it
because “an alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert selective
enforcement as a defense against his deportation.” Id. at 488 (1999).
85

INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).

86

INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 292-93.
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serious constitutional questions.”87 Emphasizing the historical difference between
judicial review and habeas corpus review of immigration administrative actions,88 the
Court concluded that no part of IIRIRA “speaks with sufficient clarity to bar jurisdiction
pursuant to the general habeas statute.”89 “At no point . . . does IIRIRA make express
reference to § 2241.”90 Therefore, the Court concluded that habeas jurisdiction survived
IIRIRA.91
87

INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314.

88

The Court explained that judicial review and habeas review are two distinct, co-existing

concepts in immigration law. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 311-13. Originally, a habeas
petition was the sole method to seek federal court review of administrative immigration
decisions. In 1961, Congress enacted a judicial review statute that supplemented the
existing habeas review with a petition for review process with a petition directly filed in
the appropriate court of appeals. See Motomura, Judicial Review in Immigration Cases
After AADC, supra note 40, at 395-96. While IIRIRA revamped “judicial review” of
immigration administrative actions, the Court concluded that the provisions of IIRIRA at
issue in St. Cyr did not also revamp “habeas review.” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 313-14.
89

INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 312-13.

90

INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 312 n.36. In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that “[t]he

Court today finds ambiguity in the utterly clear language of a statute that forbids the
district court (and all other courts) to entertain the claims of aliens such as respondent St.
Cyr, who have been found deportable by reason of their criminal acts. It fabricates a
superclear statement, ‘magic words’ requirement for the congressional expression of such
an intent, unjustified in law and unparalleled in any other area of our jurisprudence.” INS
v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 326-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court has yet to directly address the meaning and effect of section
1252(f)(1), but commentators (including the Supreme Court in dicta) have described this
section as a limitation on the issuance of class-wide injunctions.92 The next section will
analyze the statutory text of section 1252(f)(1), and using McNary, Catholic Social
Services and St. Cyr as guides, attempt to parse out its effect.

IV.

Deciphering 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1)
While the Supreme Court has yet to directly interpret section 1252(f)(1), the

Court gave brief mention to the entire section 1252(f) in American-Arab. In that case, the
Court rejected the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s determination that section
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INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 312-14. For further discussion of St. Cyr and its underlying

issues, see, e.g., Lee Gelernt, The 1996 Immigration Legislation and the Assault on the
Courts, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 455 (2001); Daniel Kanstroom, St Cyr or Insincere? The
Strange Quality of Supreme Court Victory, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 413 (2002); David A.
Martin, Behind the Scenes on a Different Set: What Congress Needs to Do in the
Aftermath of St. Cyr and Nguyen, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313 (2002); Gerald L. Neuman,
Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1963 (2000).
92

Reno v. American Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1999);

Benson, Back to the Future, supra note 40, at 1454; Nancy Morawetz, Predicting the
Meaning of INA § 242(b)(9), 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 453, 454 (2000); Neuman, Federal
Courts Issues in Immigration Law, supra note 2, at 1679; Volpp, Court-Stripping and
Class-Wide Relief, supra note 28, at 468.
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1252(f) contains an independent, affirmative grant of jurisdiction. The Court stated in
dicta:
Even respondents scarcely try to defend the Ninth Circuit’s reading of §
1252(f) as a jurisdictional grant. By its plain terms, and even by its title,
that provision is nothing more or less than a limit on injunctive relief. It
prohibits federal courts from granting class-wide injunctive relief against
the operation of §§ 1221-1231, but specifies that this ban does not extend
to individual cases. To find in this an affirmative grant of jurisdiction is to
go beyond what the language will bear.93
But what, exactly, is the effect of section 1252(f)(1)? Does it indeed prohibit “federal
courts from granting class-wide injunctive relief against the operation of §§ 1221-1231?”
If so, what does it mean to prohibit class-wide injunctive relief “against the operation” of
those statutory provisions? It will be helpful here to review the exact language of section
1252(f)(1):
Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of the identity of the
party or parties bringing the action, no court (other than the Supreme
Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the
operation of the provisions of part IV of this subchapter, as amended by
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an

93

Reno v. American Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 481-82 (1999)

(Scalia, J.).
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individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been
initiated.94
a.

Textual Review
Reading the text of section 1252(f)(1) itself, it is not obvious what the section

bars. A closer intrinsic review of the statutory section alone may cause the Supreme
Court to backtrack from its dicta in American-Arab that the section “prohibits federal
courts from granting class-wide injunctive relief against the operation of §§ 12211231.”95 To be sure, the title of section 1252(f) (“Limit on injunctive relief”) suggests
some sort of limit on injunctive relief, but under what circumstances is not clear. 96

94

The immigration service has not issued any regulations interpreting section 1252(f)(1).

95

Reno v. American Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 481.

96

The general title of section 1252 (“Judicial review of orders of removal”) only adds

further uncertainty. Courts have struggled with the question whether section 1252 as a
whole applies only in the context of removal proceedings, or whether its provisions also
apply to immigration service actions that are not a part of removal proceedings. The
immigration service performs many functions that do not necessarily involve the
institution of removal proceedings, including the administration of benefit programs
(such as adjudicating asylum applications, applications for permanent residency and
applications for temporary visas). Whether section 1252 applies to review of these types
of administrative actions is unsettled. See, e.g., Spencer Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S., 345
F.3d 683, 692 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing but declining to reach the issue of whether
section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies outside the context of removal proceedings); CDI
Information Serv., Inc. v. Reno, 278 F.3d 616, 618-20 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding that
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The text of section 1252(f)(1) is self-limiting in several ways. Remember, the
section states that “no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or
authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of part IV of this
subchapter” (emphasis added). The meaning of this italicized phrase is critical in
determining the scope of section 1252(f)(1). Just as “a determination” was a critical term
in McNary, section 1252(f)(1) has its own critical terms.
For example, “operation of” is a critical term in section 1252(f)(1). What does it
mean to enjoin or restrain the “operation of” the specified statutes? This issue has
already received some attention. Courts have determined that to give effect to the
inclusion of the term “operation of,” section 1252(f)(1) should be interpreted to mean that
no court may issue class-wide injunctive relief eliminating the function of a statute, but
that a court may issue class-wide injunctive relief to remedy the way in which the
immigration service is causing a statute to function.97 In other words, to enjoin the
“operation of” a statute is to completely foreclose its application in any instance, which is

section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies beyond review of orders of removal); Samirah v.
O’Connell, 335 F.3d 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub. nom., Samirah v.
Ashcroft, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2811 (2004) (same); Van Dinh v. Reno, 197 F.3d 427,
432 (10th Cir. 1999) (same).
97

Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 873, 886 (9th Cir. 2003); Grimaldo v. Reno, 187 F.R.D. 643,

648 (D. Colo. 1999).
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an entirely different concept than issuing an injunction preventing the immigration
service from implementing a statute in an impermissible manner.98
For example, a foreign national sought to amend his complaint to create a class
action challenging the immigration service’s detention practices. The class action
complaint requested injunctive relief. The district court held that section 1252(f)(1) did
not affect the class action complaint because the complaint did not seek an injunction
against the operation of the applicable sections, but rather sought “to enjoin alleged
constitutional violations by [the immigration service] in its administration of [the statute]
and/or its own regulations.”99
Similarly, in a case that arose prior to the effective date of IIRIRA, a district court
speculated that section 1252(f)(1) does not apply to a situation where a class seeks to
“enjoin constitutional violations and policies and practices.”100 The court recognized a
distinction between an injunction preventing the operation of a statute and an injunction
ordering implementation of a statute “under the appropriate standard.”101
The Ninth Circuit affirmed this approach in Ali v. Ashcroft, a case founded on a
class action habeas petition seeking to enjoin the government from enforcing removal to
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Professors Motomura, Neuman and Volpp have also discussed this concept. See

Judicial Review In Immigration Cases After AADC, supra note 40, at 439;Federal
Courts Issues in Immigration Law, supra note 2, at 1682-83; Court-Stripping and ClassWide Relief, supra note 28, at 473.
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Grimaldo v. Reno, 187 F.R.D. at 648.
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Tefel v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. 608, 618 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
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Tefel v. Reno, 972 F. Supp. at 618.
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Somalia because that country has no functioning central government.102 The Ninth
Circuit upheld the district court’s determination that section 1252(f)(1) does not apply to
class actions challenging the manner in which a statute is implemented. Giving effect to
the use of the term “operation of,” the Ninth Circuit explained that “1252(f)(1) limits the
district court’s authority to enjoin [the immigration service] from carrying out legitimate
removal orders. Where, however, a petitioner seeks to enjoin conduct that allegedly is
not even authorized by the statute, the court is not enjoining the operation of part IV of
subchapter II, and § 1252(f)(1) therefore is not implicated.”103
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, perhaps inadvertently, lent
support to this interpretation of section 1252(f)(1). The Court stated, “[o]ne cannot come
away from reading this section [section 1252] without having the distinct impression that
Congress meant to allow litigation challenging the new system by, and only by, aliens
against whom the new procedures had been applied.”104 Thus, challenges to the new
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Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 2003). The Immigration and Nationality

Act governs to which countries a foreign national may be removed. 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)(2)(E). The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to determine “whether the
Attorney General can remove an alien to one of the countries designated in [the
governing section] without obtaining that country's acceptance of the alien prior to
removal.” Jama v. INS, 329 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1407
(2004).
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Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d at 886.

104

American Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. Reno, 199 F.3d 1352, 1359-60 (D.C. Cir.

2000) (emphasis added). In American Immigration Lawyers Association v. Reno, the
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system fall under section 1252(f)(1), but those challenges do not necessarily include
challenges to the way the immigration service is implementing the new system.
The legislative history also supports the argument that “operation of” signifies
that Congress meant only to block injunctive relief halting the functioning of the new
system. The House Committee Report for the House of Representatives version of
IIRIRA, which contains an identical version of what became section 1252(f)(1), states
that the purpose of section 1252(f) is to prevent single district courts or courts of appeals,
but not the Supreme Court, from enjoining “the operation of the new removal procedures
established in this legislation. These limitations do not preclude challenges to the new
procedures, but the procedures will remain in force while such lawsuits are pending. In
addition, courts may issue injunctive relief pertaining to the case of an individual alien,
and thus protect against any immediate violation of rights.”105 This statement evidences
that the House Committee was concerned that class-wide injunctions would bring the
entire new system to a grinding halt. This is a different issue from whether the
immigration service is implementing the system consistent with the statute and the
Constitution.

court held that organizational plaintiffs did not have standing to bring statutory or
constitutional claims challenging the operation of IIRIRA’s expedited removal program.
The court concluded that Congress “contemplated that lawsuits challenging its enactment
would be brought, if it all, by individual aliens who —during the sixty-day period—were
aggrieved by the statute’s implementation.” Id. at 1359.
105

H.R. REP. NO. 104-469 (I) at 161 (1996).
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Thus, giving effect to the term “operation of” leads to an interpretation where
courts may not issue injunctive relief challenging the legality of the whole system of
review created by IIRIRA, but may issue injunctive relief preventing the immigration
service from administering the system in an inappropriate manner.
Section 1252(f)(1) is also self-limiting in that only the “operation of” part IV is
implicated. Part IV is entitled “Inspection, Apprehension, Examination, Exclusion, and
Removal,” and encompasses sections 1221 through 1231. This part contains many
important provisions, including provisions governing expedited removal, arrest of foreign
nationals, release pursuant to bond, detention of foreign nationals, determinations as to
who is removable from the United States, the procedures to be employed during removal
proceedings, cancellation of removal,106 voluntary departure,107 and the procedures to be
employed in actually removing foreign nationals from the United States (including
detention pending removal). There are many important administrative functions
authorized by statutes residing outside of part IV, however. If a case involves a function
authorized outside of part IV, section 1252(f)(1) should not apply. In fact, plaintiffs
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Cancellation of removal allows for waiver of removal in very narrow circumstances.

For further discussion of cancellation of removal, see CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY
MAILMAN AND STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 64.04.
107

Voluntary departure is a procedure through which an immigration judge allows a

foreign national ordered removed to voluntarily depart from the United States during a
specified time frame. For further discussion of voluntary departure, see CHARLES
GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN AND STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND
PROCEDURE § 64.05.
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continue to bring class actions challenging how the immigration service is administering
portions of the Immigration and Nationality Act housed outside of part IV.108
At times, the line between part IV and other parts is not bright, as there are cases
that involve interrelated actions authorized under and outside of part IV. 109 This raises
the issue of when a court is restraining or enjoining the operation of part IV to trigger the
limitations of section 1252(f)(1). For example, the asylum benefit is authorized under
part I. It is possible, however, to seek asylum during a removal proceeding governed by
part IV. Similarly, adjustment of status to legal permanent resident is covered in part V,
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See, e.g., Ngwanyia v. Ashcroft, 302 F. Supp.2d 1076 (D. Minn. 2004) (granting,

without addressing section 1252(f)(1), partial summary judgment to class challenging
immigration service procedures in adjudicating permanent residence applications of those
granted asylum and challenging procedures used in issuing documentation of work
authorization to those granted asylum).
109

For example, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit recently noted that section

1252(a)(2)(C) (which bars judicial review of orders against foreign nationals who have
committed certain crimes), would bar review of the asylum application of a foreign
national subject to removal, despite that section 1252 generally permits judicial review of
asylum determinations. In other words, the Third Circuit determined that the bar against
judicial review of removal orders based on criminal conduct trumps the normal
availability of judicial review of asylum determinations. Bakhtriger v. Elwood, 360 F.3d
414, 419 n.4 (3d Cir. 2004).
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but a foreign national may seek adjustment of status during a part IV removal proceeding
in certain circumstances.110
The statute’s specific reference to part IV, instead of referring to the entire
subchapter or the entire Immigration and Nationality Act, counteracts an interpretation
that 1252(f)(1) is triggered any time part IV is implicated.111 Courts have implemented
this reasoning. For example, a class of individuals illegally residing in the United States
who had prematurely filed adjustment of status applications sought to prevent the
immigration service from using information in those applications to remove them from
the United States. The district court held that section 1252(f)(1) would not prevent the
issuance of injunctive relief because the statute’s “own terms” restricted its scope to part
IV. The court interpreted the class claim before it as addressing the proper procedure for
handling a prematurely filed application for adjustment of status, and concluded that
those procedures are not found in part IV of subchapter II.112 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit
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See, e.g., Padilla v. Ridge, No. M-03-126 (S.D. Tex. March 31, 2004) (Order certifying

class of foreign nationals challenging the immigration service’s practices in providing
documentation of permanent resident status granted in removal proceedings).
111

Section 1252(f)(1) contrasts with other sections of IIRIRA that do not restrict their

reach to only one part of the Immigration and Nationality Act. For example, section
1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) removes federal court jurisdiction over acts “the authority for which is
specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General.”
(emphasis added).
112

Ramos v. Ashcroft, No. 02-C-8266, 2004 WL 161520 at *6 (N.D. Ill. January 16,

2004); see also North Jersey Media Group Inc., v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp.2d 288, 295
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(en banc) held that section 1252(f)(1) did not preclude a preliminary injunction issued
under a part other than part IV, even if the injunction affects an action arising under part
IV.113
So far, the textual analysis of section 1252(f)(1) can reasonably lead to the
conclusion that the statute does not block injunctions ordering the immigration service to
implement the immigration laws in a different way, and also that the restrictions of
section 1252(f)(1), whatever they may be, only narrowly apply to the actions specified in
part IV, and not to those actions that may interact with part IV. Returning to the classwide injunction in Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, if courts adopt this interpretation of
section 1252(f)(1), section 1252(f)(1), had it existed at the time, would not have affected
the class-wide injunction issued in that case. First, the injunction in Haitian Refugee
Center v. Smith did not enjoin or restrain the “operation of” a statute (rather it affected
how the immigration service implemented a statute). Second, the injunction affected

(D.N.J. 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002) (discussing that
section 1252(f)(1) does not prohibit injunctions dealing with actions collateral to part IV);
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp.2d 948, 955 (E.D. Mich. 2002), aff’d on other
grounds, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (same).
113

Catholic Soc. Serv., Inc. v. INS, 232 F.3d 1139, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).

Yes, this is the same Catholic Social Services class described supra notes 55 to 66. The
original panel had held that the injunction ultimately interfered with actions related to
part IV, and therefore section 1252(f)(1) barred injunctive relief. Catholic Soc. Serv.,
Inc. v. INS, 182 F.3d 1053, 1061-62 (9th Cir. 1999), rev’d en banc, 232 F.3d 1139 (9th
Cir. 2000).
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asylum procedures authorized outside of part IV (even though some of the asylum
procedures took place during a part IV removal hearing).
b.

The Connection to the Legalization Cases
The legalization cases help to decipher the text of section 1252(f)(1). As

explained above, the textual significance of the term “operation of” in section 1252(f)(1)
is reminiscent of the textual significance of “a determination” in McNary. Also, the
distinction between injunctions that foreclose the operation of a statute and injunctions
that remedy the unlawful administration of a statute is analogous to the
procedural/substantive distinction emphasized by lower courts in applying McNary and
Catholic Social Services.114 Perhaps, however, the connection between section
1252(f)(1) and McNary and Catholic Social Services is more significant than analogy.
So far, the analysis of section 1252(f)(1) has not revealed any textual mention of
class actions or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. It seems the assumption that section
1252(f)(1) limits injunctive relief to individual actions only stems from a particular
reading of the last phrase of section 1252(f)(1), which this article has not yet discussed.
That last phrase reads “other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an
individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.” The
reading that presumably leads to the conclusion that section 1252(f)(1) prohibits certain
class-wide injunctions is that this phrase means that no court may enjoin or restrain the
operation of part IV except in the context of an individual action. But that is not the only
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Lower courts recognized a distinction between challenges to the policies and

procedures the immigration service used to administer the legalization program versus
challenges to substantive determinations under the statute. See supra note 69.
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possible reading of the section. Catholic Social Services reminds us that a major issue in
the legalization class action litigation was whether individuals deterred by the
immigration service’s regulations could seek review, despite that the challenged
regulation was never specifically applied to them. The Supreme Court held in Catholic
Social Services that individuals must feel the application of an immigration statute or
regulation in some concrete way before that individual has standing to seek review.
Looking through the lens of Catholic Social Services, it is interesting to re- look at section
1252(f)(1).
Again, the relevant last phrase states that no court may enjoin or restrain “other
than with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against
whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.” Could the aim of section
1252(f)(1) simply be to thwart the ripeness issue of Catholic Social Services? Perhaps
section 1252(f)(1) can be satisfied, and a class-wide injunction may issue, as long as the
class is comprised of individuals actually subjected to the application of a provision of
part IV during removal proceedings.115 In other words, perhaps the statute does not limit
injunctive relief to individual actions, but rather aims to limit injunctive relief to
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The language of this last phrase of section 1252(f)(1) restricting the issuance of

injunctive relief unless proceedings have already been initiated makes sense in this
context. This language describes the kinds of individuals who may obtain injunctive
relief-- those “against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated.” This
language also serves to emphasize that part IV is the only aim of the section, see supra
notes 106-108, as the section limits injunctive relief to an individual alien in removal
proceedings.
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individuals who have actually felt the application of the provision at issue. After all,
section 1252(f)(1) does not explicitly limit injunctive relief to “individual actions,” but
rather limits injunctive relief to individuals subjected to the application of a provision and
against whom proceedings have been initiated.
This interpretation of section 1252(f)(1) coincides with the nature of class actions
generally. A class action is a procedural device that allows for representative suits,
relying on named plaintiffs to establish relevant statutory requirements.116 If an
individual qualifying under section 1252(f)(1) seeks an injunction, the availability of
injunctive relief should not depend on whether that individual is representing a class,
unless, of course, Congress explicitly stated that it should.
The language of the section governing review of expedited removal decisions
supports an interpretation that Congress did not expressly bar class-wide injunctions
through the text of section 1252(f)(1).117 The expedited removal section instructs that
“no court may—certify a class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” in
proceedings involving the expedited removal scheme. 118 That clearer language is
evidence that Congress knows how to include clear terms to eliminate the use of the class
action device. Section 1252(f)(1), however, does not even contain any variation of the

116

See ALBA CONTE AND HERBERT B. NEWBERG, 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, §§1:1,

1:2 (4th Ed. 2003).
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Referring to section 1252(e) to determine the meaning of section 1252(f)(1) is

especially appropriate given that section 1252(f)(1) was enacted at the same time as
section 1252(e), as both were entirely new subsections enacted by IIRIRA.
118

8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1)(B).
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term “class,” nor does it mention Rule 23 in any way.119 The only term that can be
interpreted to limit multi-party action is the use of the word “individual,” but, as
explained above, the use of the term “individual” could be interpreted as limiting
injunctive relief to those individuals who have felt the effects of the challenged provision,
and not limiting injunctive relief to individual actions only.
In the social security context, the Supreme Court held that a statute must contain a
clear, express intent to exempt an action from a rule of civil procedure.120 The Supreme
Court did not find “the necessary clear expression of congressional intent” to prohibit the
use of the class action device in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).121 That section provided that “any
individual” could obtain federal court review of certain social security administrative
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If Congress intended the foreclosure of all class-wide relief, surely section 1252(f)(1)

would contain language at least as comprehensive as section 1252(e). Professor Volpp
has argued that section 1252(f)(1) “nowhere addresses joinder, and only address relief.”
Court Stripping and Class- Wide Relief, supra note 28, at 471. Professor Volpp has also
argued that section 1252(f)(1) does not bar forms of relief other than injunctive. Court
Stripping and Class-Wide Relief, supra note 28, at 473-74; see also Neuman, Federal
Courts Issues in Immigration Law, supra note 2 at 1684-85. In the context of expedited
removal, Congress wrote that no court may “enter declaratory, injunctive, or other
equitable relief.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1)(A). This specific listing of various types of
relief emphasizes that section 1252(f)(1) only limits injunctive relief, and does not limit
other types of relief.
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Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 699-701 (1979).
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Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. at 700.
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actions.122 Recognizing that “a wide variety of federal jurisdictional provisions speak in
terms of individual plaintiffs,” the Court determined that the use of the phrase “any
individual” was not a “necessary clear expression of congressional intent.”123 The Court
explained that “it is not unusual that [§ 405(g)] . . . speaks in terms of an individual
plaintiff, since the Rule 23 class-action device was designed to allow an exception to the
usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties
only.”124 Similar to section 405(g), section 1252(f)(1) refers to “an individual alien,” but
contains no “necessary clear expression of congressional intent” to exempt immigration
actions from Rule 23.
Congress’ inclusion of a broad restriction on types of relief and specific ban on
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 actions in the expedited removal section stands in
sharp contrast to section 1252(f)(1). If Congress meant to bar all class-wide injunctive
relief, why does section 1252(f)(1) contain the ambiguous reference to “individual” and
contain no reference to Rule 23? Perhaps the answer is that section 1252(f)(1) only bars
injunctive relief to a class comprised of members with unripe claims.
This reading of section 1252(f)(1)—that the statute does not block the issuance of
class-wide injunctive relief if the class claims are ripe—receives additional support from
the Supreme Court’s legalization opinions. In McNary, the Supreme Court reasoned that
if Congress had intended the legalization special judicial review provision to apply to
every possible action, Congress could have used more explicit statutory language to
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Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. at 699 n.12.
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express that intent.125 Similarly, Congress could have used clearer language in section
1252(f)(1), as it did in the expedited removal section, to indicate that it meant to bar
class-wide injunctive relief. Also, the Supreme Court in McNary relied on the strong
presumption of judicial review of administrative action.126 These principles support the
above reading of section 1252(f)(1).
c.

The Role of the Serious Constitutional Problem
Scholars have commented on the Supreme Court’s evolving habit, in the

immigration context and in other contexts, to avoid deciding cases on constitutional
grounds in favor of resolving cases through statutory interpretation that buries the
constitutional issue.127 This trend holds true in the context of immigration statutes
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McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. 479, 494 (1991).
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McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc., 498 U.S. at 496.
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See, e.g., Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty, supra note 2, at 2506-11; Hiroshi Motomura,

The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive
Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1992); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration
Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory
Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J.545 (1990). It is beyond the scope of this article to
comment on the propriety of using statutory canons to interpret statutes in general or to
evaluate their role in deciding cases in lieu of reaching constitutional holdings. Likewise,
this article will not discuss the pros and cons of different philosophies of statutory
interpretation. For discussion and analysis of such theories, see, for example, WILLIAM
N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (1994); NORMAN J. SINGER,
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purporting to limit federal court review. McNary, Catholic Social Services, AmericanArab and St. Cyr are all examples of this trend.128
At first glance, this trend appears to have little effect in the context of section
1252(f)(1). In St. Cyr, the Court faced a proposed interpretation of a statute that would
have eliminated all avenues of federal court review of constitutional claims. In the case
of 1252(f)(1), however, a broad reading is that no court (other than the Supreme Court)

STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, Chapter 48A (6th Ed. 2000) (collecting
articles).
128

In McNary and Catholic Social Services, the Court held that the special review

provisions of the legalization program allowed for certain claims to be brought in the
district court rather than address the issue of whether total preclusion of those claims in
the federal courts would be constitutional. Likewise, in St. Cyr, the Court held that
IIRIRA did not preclude habeas jurisdiction, rather than address the issue of whether
Congress could have constitutionally eliminated all federal court jurisdiction over certain
claims. “[I]f an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, and where an alternative interpretation of the statute is ‘fairly
possible,’ we are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems.” INS v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001) (citations omitted). Another recent example of this
trend in the immigration context is Zadvydas v. Davis. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). In
Zadvydas, the Supreme Court interpreted a statute governing post-final order detention to
include an implicit reasonable time limitation. The Court interpreted the statute in such a
manner because “serious constitutional concerns” would be raised if the statute permitted
indefinite detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 682.
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may issue class-wide injunctive relief regarding anything that arguably relates to part IV.
While this broad reading would no doubt amount to a substantial disruption of the status
quo and would also eliminate an important method to challenge the behavior of the
immigration service, individual injunctions would still be permitted, and the Supreme
Court could still issue class-wide injunctive relief.129 Therefore, it is appropriate to
question whether the Supreme Court would base its interpretation of section 1252(f)(1) to
avoid a lurking serious constitutional problem.130
It is possible, however, that a broad reading of section 1252(f)(1) could trigger the
potential deprivation of review that concerned the Court in McNary.131 In McNary, the
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Professor Neuman has questioned the exact nature of the Supreme Court’s role created

by section 1252(f)(1) and whether it “amount[s] to an improper exercise of original
jurisdiction.” Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in Immigration Law, supra note 2, at 1686.
If the Supreme Court’s ability to issue injunctive relief under section 1252(f)(1) arises
under its appellate jurisdiction, Professor Neuman has questioned whether the Supreme
Court could issue injunctive relief upon appellate review of a lower court’s issuance of a
form of relief other than injunctive. Neuman, Federal Courts Issues in Immigration Law,
supra note 2, at 1686.
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This question is related to, yet different from, the question whether the statute

represents a constitutional exercise of Congressional power. The question addressed here
is whether anticipated constitutional issues would influence the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the meaning and effect of the statute.
131

Section 1252(f)(1) could implicate other potential constitutional issues. Professor

Volpp has suggested that section 1252(f) could be challenged as violating Article III of
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Supreme Court determined that individual actions based on the administrative record of a
single hearing were an ineffective means to challenge a pattern or practice of the
immigration service. If injunctive relief is only available to individuals, but it is also
impossible for individuals to effectively bring pattern and practice claims, can a court
effectively address a pattern and practice claim under a broad reading of section
1252(f)(1)?132
There are ample reasons to construe section 1252(f)(1) not to constrain the use of
the class action device unless the class is comprised of individuals with unripe claims.133
Suppose, however, that a broad reading of section 1252(f)(1) is adopted. As described
above, St. Cyr cemented habeas corpus jurisdiction as a distinct method to access federal
court review. In the wake of St. Cyr, the next section discusses whether habeas corpus
jurisdiction can preserve what section 1252(f)(1) may take away.

V.

Habeas Jurisdiction and Immigration Class Actions

the Constitution, as well as violating notions of due process and equal protection. Volpp,
Court Stripping and Class- Wide Relief, supra note 28, at 475-77. Another potential
constitutional issue is whether Congress created a proper role for the Supreme Court in
section 1252(f)(1). See supra note 129. The Court may be swayed to interpret section
1252(f)(1) to eliminate the need to reach that issue.
132

The potential deprivation of review is amplified if section 1252(f)(1) is interpreted to

bar all types of class-wide relief.
133

Of course, this class issue is relevant only if the “operation of” part IV is implicated.

See supra notes 106-113.
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What if there existed a parallel universe where section 1252(f)(1) could be
ignored?134 If section 1252(f)(1) proves to be a broad bar against class-wide injunctive
relief, is there an alternative method to obtain such relief? One possible alternative
method is immigration class action litigation via habeas corpus jurisdiction. As is
described below, however, this alternative presents its own set of roadblocks.
In St. Cyr, the Supreme Court based its decision that habeas corpus review
survived IIRIRA on the absence of a clear statement precluding habeas review. 135 The
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It is important to remember that there are provisions in section 1252 other than section

1252(f)(1) that are problematic to immigration class actions, including section
1252(b)(9). Professor Motomura has argued that courts should allow pattern and practice
litigation to proceed despite sections 1252(b)(9) and 1252(f)(1). Motomura, Judicial
Review In Immigration Cases After AADC, supra note 40, at 434-39; see supra note 77.
He concludes that section 1252(b)(9) “probably does not supersede McNary.” Judicial
Review In Immigration Cases After AADC, supra note 40 at 437. Professor Motomura’s
article appeared before the Supreme Court’s opinion in St. Cyr. This part will analyze
whether the Court’s opinion in St. Cyr offers another possible method to maintain an
immigration class action out of the reach of section 1252.
135

See supra note 87. Senator Orrin Hatch recently introduced a bill, the “Fairness in

Immigration Litigation Act,” that proposes to amend section 1252 to specify that every
reference to the elimination or curtailment of judicial review in section 1252 also
eliminates or curtails habeas review. Fairness in Immigration Litigation Act, S. 2443,
108th Cong. (2004). The Hatch bill contains language that section 1252(a)(2) should not
“be construed as precluding consideration by the circuit courts of appeals of
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absence of specific mention of habeas jurisdiction is crucial, according to the Court,
because “in the immigration context, ‘judicial review’ and ‘habeas corpus’ have
historically distinct meanings.”136 Because IIRIRA did not eliminate habeas jurisdiction,
the Court held that a district court could hear, via the independent realm of habeas
jurisdiction, claims that section 1252 would otherwise bar.137
a.

The Reach of 8 U.S.C. § 1252 After INS v. St. Cyr

constitutional claims or pure questions of law raised upon petitions for review filed in
accordance with this section.” S. 2443 at §2(a)(1)(A). The Hatch bill also provides that
petitions for review filed under section 1252 “shall be the sole and exclusive means of
raising any and all claims with respect to orders of removal.” S. 2443 at § 2(a)(1)(B).
This bill does not, however, address the problem faced by pattern and practice litigants,
as the petition for review process established by section 1252 may never grant them
adequate review of their claims. As explained in McNary, the administrative record of an
individual proceeding may not be sufficient to support a pattern or practice claim. See
supra notes 47-49.
136

INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 311 (2001). In St. Cyr, the Supreme Court specifically

reviewed IIRIRA sections 1252(a)(1), 1252(a)(2)(C), and 1252(b)(9) to determine
whether those sections contained a “clear and unambiguous statement of Congress’ intent
to bar [habeas] petitions.” INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 308, 310-11.
137

Specifically, in St. Cyr the Supreme Court held that a district court could review, via a

habeas petition, the legal challenges of a foreign national with a criminal history despite
section 1252 (a)(2)(C), which forbids judicial review of the removal orders of certain
foreign nationals with criminal histories.
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A reasonable question following St. Cyr is whether section 1252 contains limits
that only apply to petitions for review, but not to petitions for habeas corpus. 138 After St.
Cyr, individual habeas actions are now permissible despite that section 1252 would bar
judicial review of the same action. If section 1252(f)(1) is interpreted to broadly bar
class-wide relief, could a court issue that same relief in the context of a habeas class
action?
Because the Court in St. Cyr specifically examined only three provisions of
section 1252 (sections 1252(a)(1), 1252(a)(2)(C), and 1252(b)(9)), courts have analyzed,
post St. Cyr, whether other provisions of section 1252 affect habeas review.139 Therefore,
a court might examine whether the restrictions of section 1252(f)(1) would apply to a
habeas action, despite St. Cyr. A court determining whether the restrictions of section
1252(f)(1) would apply to a habeas action will likely analyze two issues. First, the court
will likely consider whether section 1252(f)(1) itself bars habeas review. If not, it would
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If section 1252 applies only to judicial review, then a habeas class action would not be

subject to any of the provisions in section 1252. This would be an important benefit of
styling an action as a habeas class action. Not only would section 1252(f)(1) not apply,
but also the timing provision of section 1252(b)(9), which allows for judicial review of
final administrative orders only, would not apply. However, the practical effect of the
restrictions against review of discretionary actions contained in section 1252 (§§
1252(a)(2)(B) and 1252(g), for example) may independently exist in the habeas realm.
As described infra notes 175-183, courts have held that review of discretionary actions is
not permissible under habeas jurisdiction.
139

See infra notes 142-153.
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likely consider whether the restrictions of section 1252(f)(1) apply both to judicial review
and to habeas actions.140
Regarding the first issue, similar to the specific subsections referenced in St. Cyr,
section 1252(f)(1) also contains no clear and unambiguous statement of Congress’ intent
to abolish habeas review. Again, in St. Cyr the Court specifically required that “[f]or [the
immigration service] to prevail it must overcome both the strong presumption in favor of
judicial review of administrative action and the longstanding rule requiring a clear
statement of Congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction.”141 While the
government may argue that the language of section 1252(f)(1) is distinct enough from the
sections considered in St. Cyr to justify a holding that section 1252(f)(1) does bar habeas
review,142 such an argument contradicts the Supreme Court’s clear statement requirement
established in St. Cyr.

140

Courts of appeals have employed this two-step analysis to determine whether section

1252(d), which requires exhaustion of administrative remedies, applies to habeas
proceedings. See infra notes 150-153.
141

INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 298.

142

The government has argued, subsequent to St. Cyr, that parts of section 1252, other

than those specifically considered in St. Cyr, bar habeas review. For example, courts
have applied the reasoning of St. Cyr to hold that section 1252(g) (which was not directly
at issue in St. Cyr) does not bar habeas review. See, e.g., Carranza v. INS, 277 F.3d 65,
71 (1st Cir. 2002) (“In light of St. Cyr, [the immigration service’s] principal argument—
that section 1252(g) forecloses the exercise of habeas jurisdiction . . . is a dead letter”).
Similarly, five courts of appeal have examined the language of the statute implementing
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The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Demore v. Kim further supports the
argument that section 1252(f)(1) does not contain a clear statement eliminating habeas
corpus review. Applying the clear statement principles it emphasized in St. Cyr, the
Court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (which governs “judicial review” of claims
challenging detention during removal proceedings) did not bar habeas review.143 The
language of section 1226(e) reads: “The Attorney General’s discretionary judgment
regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to review. No court may set
aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the
detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole.”
Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, argued in her dissent that the
“[n]o court may set aside any action or decision” language of section 1226(e) is sufficient
to repeal habeas jurisdiction, especially because the text of the statutory subsections at

the Convention Against Torture in light of St. Cyr and have concluded that it also does
not contain an express revocation of habeas jurisdiction. Cadet v. Bulger, ___ F.3d ___,
No. 03-14565, 2004 WL 1615619 at *6-7 (11th Cir. July 20, 2004); Saint Fort v.
Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 191, 202 (1st Cir. 2003); Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 141 (2d
Cir. 2003); Singh v. Ashcroft, 351 F.3d 435, 441 (9th Cir. 2003); Ogbudimkpa v.
Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207, 209 (3d Cir. 2003). No court has addressed whether section
1252(f)(1) eliminates habeas jurisdiction.
143

Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003).
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issue in St. Cyr all specifically mentioned the term “judicial review,” and the provision at
issue in Demore v. Kim does not.144
The language of the text of section 1252(f)(1) also does not mention the term
“judicial review” and, similar to the statute in Demore v. Kim, states, “Regardless of the
nature of the action or claim or of the identity of the party or parties bringing the action,
no court . . . shall have jurisdiction or authority to.” Yet, the majority of the Court
remained firm in its clear statement requirement in Demore v. Kim, finding no “explicit
provision barring habeas review” in the similar language of section 1226(e).145 It seems
likely that the Supreme Court will not find a clear statement in section 1252(f)(1)
sufficient to signal the elimination of habeas jurisdiction.
The resolution of the second inquiry, whether the restrictions of section 1252(f)(1)
are applicable to habeas actions, is more complicated. The historical separation of
judicial review from habeas jurisdiction supports an argument that section 1252(f)(1) is
of no effect in the habeas realm. Section 1252(f)(1) is a part of the judicial review
program established by section 1252, and in St. Cyr the Court held that review-limiting
provisions of section 1252 did not apply to habeas actions. It is uncertain, however,
whether courts will directly adopt this argument in the context of section 1252(f)(1).

144

Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. at 534-35 (2003) (O’Conner, J., dissenting). While the title

of section 1226(e) contains the term “judicial review,” Justice O’Conner commented that
statutory titles do not per se control the meaning of statutory text. Id. at 535.
145

Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. at 517. Section 1252(f)(1) does contain the additional

language “regardless of the nature of the action,” but this statement does not explicitly
mention habeas review.
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Courts are currently facing the challenge of balancing the autonomous nature of
the habeas realm with the restrictions of section 1252. For example, the Ninth Circuit
applied section 1252(f)(1) to a habeas action but did not first discuss whether section
1252(f)(1) plays any role in a habeas action. 146 Also, courts have struggled to define the
proper role of section 1252(g) in a habeas action. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit determined that, even after St. Cyr, section 1252(g) forbids habeas review of a
challenge of a decision to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases or execute removal
orders.147 The Ninth Circuit determined that section 1252(g) itself does not bar habeas
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Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 873 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit determined that

section 1252(f)(1) did not preclude any relief because the “operation of” part IV was not
challenged. See supra note 97.
147

Sharif v. Ashcroft, 280 F.3d 786, 787 (7th Cir. 2002) (determining that St. Cyr “does

not disturb the holding of [Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee] that
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) blocks review in the district court of particular kinds of administrative
decisions”); see also Latu v. Ashcroft, ___ F.3d ___, No. 03-1215, 2004 WL 1551593 at
*5 (10th Cir. July 12, 2004) (acknowledging that section 1252(g) “does not strip the
district court of § 2241 habeas jurisdiction,” but incorporating section 1252(g) into its
decision that discretionary acts are not reviewable via habeas jurisdiction). The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has also concluded that section 1252(g) applies to a habeas
action, but in an unpublished opinion. Mendez v. Johnson, No. 03-5194, 2004 WL
1088249 at *1 (6th Cir. May 12, 2004); but see, e.g., Wallace v. Reno, 194 F.3d 279, 285
(1st Cir. 1999) (stating, in a decision that pre-dates St. Cyr, that the court is “unwilling to
read section [1252(g)] as depriving the court of authority to issue traditional ancillary
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jurisdiction (the first inquiry described above), but in doing so emphasized that the class
before the court was not seeking review of a discretionary act (thus applying the
substance of section 1252(g)).148 Also, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
discussed section 1252(g) in support of its conclusion that review of discretionary acts is
not cognizable under habeas jurisdiction.149
relief needed to protect its authority to issue the writ [of habeas corpus]” and that “[t]o
maintain habeas in the face of section [1252(g)], but deny the ancillary relief needed to
make it meaningful, would be to strain at the gnat after swallowing the camel”); Foroglou
v. Reno, 241 F.3d 111, 114 (1st Cir. 2001) (explaining in a decision issued before the
Supreme Court’s decision in St. Cyr that the reasoning of Wallace applies only when a
habeas petitioner has no other available forum for judicial review).
148

Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 873, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit reasoned that

because a discretionary determination was not at issue, section 1252(g) would not apply,
yet left open (but did not address) the possibility that section 1252(g) could bar a habeas
action if a discretionary action were at issue. For similar analysis, see Jama v. INS, 329
F.3d 630, 632-33 (8th Cir. 2003), cert granted, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 1407 (2004).
The District Court in Ali had more definitively stated that section 1252(g) “does not limit
judicial review on a petition for writ of habeas corpus,” and concluded that the section is
not applicable to habeas actions. Ali v. Ashcroft, 213 F.R.D. 390, 398 (W.D. Wash.
2003).
149

Liu v. INS, 293 F.3d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 2002). An alternative approach is to base the

conclusion that habeas review does not extend to review of discretionary acts solely in
habeas jurisprudence, and not to use section 1252 to support the decision. See also Latu
v. Ashcroft, 2004 WL 1551593 at *5 (employing similar analysis to that used in Liu).
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Additionally, at least four courts of appeals have held that section 1252(d), which
requires exhaustion of administrative remedies before “a court may review a final order
of removal,” applies to habeas actions despite St. Cyr.150 These courts rejected the
argument that the word “review” as used in section 1252(d) refers only to “judicial
review,” and does not encompass habeas review. Distinguishing section 1252(d) from
the provisions of section 1252 at issue in St. Cyr, these courts determined that section
1252(d) does not eliminate jurisdiction wholesale and only sets a condition on
jurisdiction.151 Because only a condition on jurisdiction is implicated, the courts
reasoned, section 1252(d), as applied to habeas review, does not present a substantial
constitutional question.152 According to this reasoning, the absence of a substantial
constitutional question allows the term “review” in section 1252(d) to encompass both
judicial review and habeas review.153
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Sun v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 2004); Theodoropoulos v. INS, 358 F.3d

162, 171 (2d Cir. 2004) (petition for cert. filed); Duvall v. Elwood, 336 F.3d 228, 233-34
(3d Cir. 2003); Sundar v. INS, 328 F.3d 1320, 1321 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, ___
U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 531 (2003).
151

See, e.g., Sundar v. INS, 328 F.3d at 1324-25; Sun v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d at 940-41.
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See, e.g., Sundar v. INS, 328 F.3d at 1324-25; Sun v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d at 939.

153

Courts have also considered the effect of section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (which bars review

of certain discretionary acts) on habeas jurisdiction. See, e.g., Jeanty v. Bulger, 204 F.
Supp.2d 1366, 1373-74 (S.D. Fla. 2002), aff’d sub nom., Moise v. Bulger, 321 F.3d 1336
(2003) (per curiam), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 562 (2003) (determining that 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not bar habeas review); Sierra v. INS, 258 F.3d 1213,
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Setting aside a discussion of the soundness of the legal analysis employed by
these courts of appeals, the question arises whether courts will follow this mode of
analysis with regard to section 1252(f)(1). If so, the relevant determination is whether
section 1252(f)(1) is more akin to those provisions at issue in St. Cyr (eliminating
jurisdiction) or more akin to section 1252(d) (setting a condition on jurisdiction). The
answer is most likely linked to the resolution of the issue raised earlier, whether there is a
serious constitutional problem lurking in section 1252(f)(1).154 A likely government
argument is that section 1252(f)(1) bars only a form of relief, and therefore does not bar
jurisdiction altogether. The counter-argument is that section 1252(f)(1), if interpreted
broadly, could bar meaningful review of pattern and practice claims, and therefore should
not apply to habeas actions.
b.

Challenges Facing Habeas Class Actions
Even if the restrictions of section 1252(f)(1) do not apply in the habeas context,

are habeas class actions a viable alternative to non-habeas class actions? Habeas class
actions face their own set of roadblocks. For example, a habeas class action is not
identical to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 class action and may be subject to more

1217 (10th Cir. 2001) (same). Similarly, courts have addressed the effect of section
1252(b)(5) (which addresses judicial review of nationality claims). See, e.g., Lee v.
Ashcroft, No. 01-CV-0997, 2003 WL 21310247 at *4 (E.D.N.Y. May 27, 2003)
(determining that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5) does not bar a habeas action); Gomez v. Bureau
of Immigration and Custom Enforcement, 315 F. Supp.2d 630, 634 (M.D. Pa. 2004)
(same).
154

See supra notes 127-132.
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stringent requirements. Further, the maintenance of a habeas class action depends on a
custody requirement.155 Other issues are whether the scope of habeas review allows a
court to review the challenged behavior and whether habeas review allows a court to
grant the requested relief.
While courts have adopted the class action device in habeas actions, habeas class
actions are not identical to Rule 23 class actions. The Ninth Circuit recently approved the
use of Rule 23 to govern a habeas immigration class action,156 and courts have allowed
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The relevant habeas statute is 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which provides that a writ of habeas

corpus may not be granted unless a “prisoner” is “in custody,” among other requirements.
For an in-depth discussion of the history of the writ of habeas corpus in the immigration
context, see Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal
of Aliens, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 961 (1998).
156

Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 873, 890-91 (9th Cir. 2003). See also Kazarov v. Achim,

No. 02-C-5097, 2003 WL 22956006 at *7-8 (N.D. Ill. December 12, 2003) (certifying,
under Rule 23(b)(2), class challenging detention procedures). For pre-IIRIRA
immigration habeas class actions, see, for example, Bertrand v. Vigile, 535 F. Supp.
1020, 1024-25 (S.D.N.Y 1982), rev’d on other grounds, 684 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1982)
(approving certification of class of Haitian foreign national detainees challenging the
exercise of discretionary authority with respect to release on parole); but see, for
example, Wang v. Reno, 862 F. Supp. 801, 811 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (declining to create
habeas class of foreign nationals challenging asylum decisions because, among other
things, too many individual issues were present).

63

habeas class actions in non-immigration contexts.157 Courts have explained, however,
that Rule 23 does not strictly govern habeas class actions. As the Ninth Circuit observed
in Ali v. Ashcroft, courts have looked to Rule 23 for guidance in adjudicating habeas class
actions, and have even applied the provisions of Rule 23 to determine whether to certify a
habeas class, but technically Rule 23 does not apply to habeas proceedings.158 Courts
have emphasized that a habeas class action is only a case management option available to
federal courts, not a form of litigation authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.159 Also, courts sitting in habeas jurisdiction may apply a tougher version of
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See, e.g., Morgan v. Sielaff, 546 F.2d 218, 222 (7th Cir. 1976) (affirming certification

of habeas class of state prisoners); Bijeol v. Benson, 513 F.2d 965, 969 (7th Cir. 1975)
(partially affirming certification of class of federal prisoners); Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d
1115, 1126-27 (2d Cir. 1974) (approving of certification of habeas class of state
prisoners); Williams v. Richardson, 481 F.2d 358, 361 (8th Cir. 1973) (reversing district
court conclusion that a habeas class action could never be appropriate). See also RANDY
HERTZ AND JAMES S. LIEBMAN, 1-11 FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE §11.4(b) (4th Ed. 2003); ALBA CONTE AND HERBERT B. NEWBERG, 8
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §25:28 (4th Ed. 2003).
158

Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 873, 890-91 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Sero, 506 F.2d at 1125

and Bijeol, 513 F.2d at 968).
159

Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d at 1125. According to the Second Circuit in Sero, while the

class action device as governed by Rule 23 may not be directly imported into habeas
actions, federal courts do have the power to create procedural devices in habeas actions
that borrow from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 1125. In Sero, the Second
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the Rule 23 requirements.160 Therefore, meeting the requirements of Rule 23 is not a
guarantee that a federal court will agree to hear a habeas action as a class action.
If a court agrees to borrow the class action device and apply it to a habeas class
action, the habeas custody requirement presents a further challenge. One issue is whether
the named plaintiff is “in custody.” Another issue is who is the proper custodian in an
immigration habeas case.
Addressing the second issue first, the identity of the proper custodian is important
because the geographical scope of a putative habeas immigration class injunction is only
as wide as the court’s jurisdiction over the proper custodian. A narrow view of the
identity of the proper custodian could diminish the potential effectiveness of a habeas
class to rectify a widely implemented practice or policy of the immigration service.161 If

Circuit explained that “the unusual circumstance” of the case was a “compelling
justification for allowing a multi-party proceeding similar to the class action authorized
by the Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id. at 1125. See also Bertrand v. Vigile, 535 F. Supp.
1020, 1024 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (explaining that “a federal court may permit multi-party
habeas actions similar to the class actions authorized by the Rules of Civil Procedure
when the nature of the claim so requires.”) (emphasis added).
160

See, e.g., Bertrand v. Vigile, 535 F. Supp. at 1025 (recognizing that a more stringent

form of the commonality prerequisite of Rule 23 may be applied in habeas class actions).
161

See Yi v. Maugans, 24 F.3d 500, 507 (3d Cir. 1994) (refusing to certify nationwide

habeas class of immigrant detainees based on custodian issue); Wang v. Reno, 862 F.
Supp. 801, 811-12 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (refusing to certify subclass based on custodian
issue).
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the proper custodian is the warden of one specific detention center where a foreign
national is detained, then a district court’s reach is limited to that custodian, and any
injunction could only reach those held by that specific custodian. If, however, the proper
custodian were a national official, such as the Attorney General, then a district court
would have potential nationwide jurisdiction over all those class members under the
custody of the Attorney General.162
Courts have disagreed over who is the proper custodian in an immigration habeas
action.163 The Supreme Court recently declined to reach the issue “whether the Attorney
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For further discussion of the issue of who is the proper custodian in an immigration

habeas action, see Megan A. Ferstenfeld-Torres, “Who are We to Name? The
Applicability of the ‘Immediate-Custodian-as-Respondent’ Rule to Alien Habeas Claims
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,” 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 431 (2003); Rachel E. Rosenbloom, “Is
the Attorney General the Custodian of an INS Detainee? Personal Jurisdiction and the
‘Immediate Custodian’ Rule in Immigration-Related Habeas Actions,” 27 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 543 (2001/2002); Brian O’Donoghue, Who’s the Boss?: Armentero,
Padilla, and the Proper Respondent in Federal Habeas Corpus Law, 22 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 441 (2004) (student note). See also Lenni B. Benson, The New World of
Judicial Review of Immigration Proceedings, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 233, 260-63 (1998).
163

See, e.g. Ali v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 873, 887-888 (2003) (determining that the Attorney

General is the proper custodian due to his unique role in immigration proceedings and
also because of the “legal reality” of control of immigration detainees (that they are
frequently transferred all over the country)); Chavez-Rivas v. Olsen, 194 F. Supp.2d 368,
376 (D.N.J. 2002) (holding that the Attorney General is a proper respondent in an
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General is a proper respondent to a habeas petition filed by an alien detained pending
deportation” in Rumsfeld v. Padilla.164 The Court did hold that when present physical
confinement is challenged, the only proper respondent is the immediate custodian and
that jurisdiction lies only in the district of confinement.165 The Court further explained
that “a habeas petitioner who challenges a form of ‘custody’ other than present physical
confinement may name as respondent the entity or person who exercises legal control
with respect to the challenged ‘custody.’”166 Under Padilla, a court would have ample
reason to limit any habeas class-wide relief affecting present physical confinement to
those under the control of the immediate custodian.

immigration habeas action in the circumstance where a detainee is transferred, after the
filing of a habeas action, to a facility outside the jurisdiction of the original district court);
but see, e.g., Yi v. Maugans, 24 F.3d at 507 (concluding that the habeas custodian is the
warden of the prison where the detainee is held in the context of a putative nationwide
class action of immigrant detainees); Wang v. Reno, 862 F. Supp. at 811-12 (refusing to
certify a class partially comprised of immigrant detainees housed outside of the district
based on the conclusion that the warden of each specific facility is the custodian for
habeas purposes); see also Rosenbloom and Ferstenfeld-Torres, supra note 162, for a
thorough discussion of the conflict among the courts regarding this issue.
164

___ U.S. ____, 124 S. Ct. 2711 n.8 (2004). In Rumsfeld v. Padilla, a United States

citizen challenged his custody based on his designation as an enemy combatant. ___ U.S.
___, 124 S. Ct. at 2715.
165

___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. at 2723.
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___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. at 2720.
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The first issue involves the question of who is “in custody” to satisfy the
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2241.167 The determination is inherently case-specific, but
an important point is that actual physical restraint may not be required to meet the “in
custody” requirement. For example, whatever exactly constitutes “in custody,” a habeas
petitioner need only be “in custody” at the time the habeas petition is filed.168 For
example, courts have held that the physical removal of an individual from the United
States does not prevent the custody requirement from being met as long as the individual
was “in custody” at the time of filing.169 However, the Supreme Court has determined
that while release does not break the “in custody” requirement, every habeas case must
still satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III, section 2 of the
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For more in-depth discussion of this issue in the immigration context, see Peter

Bibring, Jurisdictional Issues In Post-Removal Habeas Challenges to Orders of Removal,
17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 135, 150-80 (2002); Alison Leal Parker, In Through the Out Dorr?
Retaining Judicial Review for Deported Lawful Permanent Resident Aliens, 101 COLUM.
L. REV. 605, 633-37 (2001) (student note).
168

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998); Zalawadia v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 292, 297

(5th Cir. 2004) (explaining that “the Supreme Court has made it clear that the ‘in
custody’ determination is made at the time the habeas petition is filed”) (quoting Spencer
v. Kemna, 523 U.S. at 7); Lopez v. Heinauer, 332 F.3d 507, 510 (8th Cir. 2003).
169

See, e.g., Zalawadia v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d at 297; Chong v. District Director, INS, 264

F.3d 378, 382-83 (3d Cir. 2001); Reyes-Sanchez v. Ashcroft, 261 F. Supp.2d 276, 282-83
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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Constitution.170 Therefore, it is possible that release could moot the case underlying the
habeas petition even if it does not technically break the “in custody” requirement.171
The requirement that a habeas petitioner be “in custody” at least at the time of
filing the petition limits the range of patterns and practices that could be challenged via a
habeas class action. Earlier this article discussed three major groups of immigration class

170

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. at 7. In Spencer, the Supreme Court determined that a

prisoner’s completion of his sentence mooted his habeas petition challenging the
revocation of his parole. The Court did not recognize any actual injury likely to be
addressed by the habeas action.
171

Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1. See Zalawadia v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d at 292 (relying on

Spencer to determine that a habeas case is not moot where the petitioner was deported but
faces a bar to reentry to the United States); Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 395
(6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub. nom., Snyder v. Rosales-Garcia, 539 U.S. 941 (2003)
(acknowledging Spencer but determining that a live case or controversy existed where
individuals with final orders of removal were released on parole pending removal);
Chong v. District Director, 264 F.3d at 383-85 (holding that deportation of habeas
petitioner did not render petition moot because the petitioner’s deportation carried the
collateral consequence of a bar against reentering the United States and stating that the
exceptions to the general mootness doctrine apply in the habeas context); but see, Patel v.
US Attorney General, 334 F.3d 1259, 1263 (11th Cir. 2003) (determining that restrictions
on returning to the United States are not sufficient restraints to satisfy the habeas “in
custody” requirement in the context of a habeas petition filed after removal). See also
Parker, supra note 167 (discussing post-removal standing issues).
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actions of the past: those challenging immigration detention; those challenging the way
the immigration service implements a benefit program; and those actions challenging the
immigration service’s procedures employed in removing foreign nationals from the
United States.172 Of the three groups, those actions challenging immigration detention
clearly face the least difficulty regarding the “in custody” requirement. The custody
requirement presents a greater roadblock to the other two groups, as those actions may or
may not involve actual physical custody at some point.
Even if a court agrees to recognize a habeas class action and the “in custody”
requirement is satisfied, the class claim must be cognizable under habeas jurisdiction.
After St. Cyr, courts are presently considering what types of claims are appropriate for
habeas review.173
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See supra notes 19-27.
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Another post-St. Cyr issue is whether habeas jurisdiction is available to those who

could also seek relief under section 1252. At least three courts of appeals have held that
foreign nationals may bring habeas actions even if judicial review is also available under
section 1252. Chmakov v. Blackman, 266 F.3d 210 (3d Cir. 2001); Liu v. INS, 293 F.3d
36 (2d Cir. 2002); Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2002). In Chmakov, the Third
Circuit specifically held that habeas review of an application for asylum was permissible,
even though judicial review of asylum determinations is permitted under section 1252.
The petitioners in Chmakov had failed to file a timely petition for judicial review.
Chmakov v. Blackman, 266 F.3d at 212-13. The Third Circuit reasoned that while no
suspension clause problem would exist if Congress had removed habeas jurisdiction for
those with some other avenue of federal court review, “it is now beyond dispute” that

70

Courts have determined that the substantive scope of habeas review after St. Cyr
does not replenish all of the review carved out by IIRIRA.174 For example, the First,175
Congress did not explicitly foreclose habeas jurisdiction in IIRIRA. Id. at 214. The
Third Circuit rejected the immigration service’s arguments that Congress need only
provide a clear statement to repeal habeas jurisdiction if a suspension clause problem is
present and that IIRIRA does contain a clear statement to abolish habeas review for
foreign nationals without criminal convictions. Id. at 214-15. The Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit has disagreed with the Chmakov reasoning, holding that when judicial
review under section 1252 is available, habeas review is not also available. Lopez v.
Heinauer, 332 F.3d 507, 510-11 (8th Cir. 2003). Also, the Ninth Circuit has dismissed
habeas petitions based on the principle of exhaustion of judicial remedies (i.e. failure to
file a timely petition for review under section 1252), and has denied to re-hear en banc a
case where the original panel used the doctrine of issue preclusion to prevent
consideration of an issue on habeas originally presented in a section 1252 petition for
review. Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 2004) (exhaustion of judicial
remedies); Acevedo-Carranza v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 539, 542 (9th Cir. 2004) (same);
Nunes v. Ashcroft, ___ F.3d ___, No. 02-55613, 2004 WL 1516777 at *1 (9th Cir. July 8,
2004) (issue preclusion).
174

Another developing issue is the scope of relief available in a habeas action. While a

habeas class action may avoid the restrictions on relief of section 1252(f)(1), a habeas
class action is inherently limited to the relief that is available in a habeas action. The Fifth
Circuit recently held that under habeas review the only relief a district court may grant is
relief necessary to undo restraints on liberty. Zalawadia v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 292 (5th
Cir. 2004). In Zalawadia, the government deported the habeas petitioner before the
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Supreme Court issued its decision in St. Cyr, despite that the petitioner also argued that
IIRIRA should not apply retroactively. Id. at 295-96. The Supreme Court remanded Mr.
Zalawadia’s case in light of St. Cyr. On remand, Mr. Zalawadia sought a determination,
under the pre-IIRIRA standard, whether he is entitled to a deportation waiver. The Fifth
Circuit refused to order the determination, and concluded that the only appropriate relief
is to vacate the illegal deportation order. Id. at 298-99. The dissent objected that that
relief is inadequate because it does not remove all of the collateral effects of the illegal
deportation order. According to the dissent, Mr. Zalawadia, now deported, will never be
able to obtain a waiver determination under the pre-IIRIRA standard, a determination that
he was entitled to at the time of his deportation proceeding. Id. at 303 (Wiener, J.
dissenting). According to the majority, habeas “cannot be used to bootstrap other claims
for relief” and “is not a tool that can be broadly employed to restore the habeas petitioner
to his or her status quo ante beyond freeing him from the restraints on liberty arising
directly from the illegal order of judgment.” Id. at 300.
175

Carranza v. INS, 277 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2002). The Court of Appeals for the First

Circuit held that a claim that the immigration service failed to exercise any discretion is
not cognizable under habeas jurisdiction where the foreign national has no statutory right
to any discretionary process. Id. at 71. The First Circuit distinguished Mr. Carranza’s
claims from those in United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954),
where the Supreme Court held that a foreign national could state a claim under habeas
jurisdiction that the immigration service failed to implement a statutorily-granted
discretionary process. Carranza v. INS, 277 F.3d at 68-69.
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Second,176 Third, 177 Fourth,178 Fifth,179 Ninth180 and Eleventh181 Circuits have all
determined that habeas review is available (after St. Cyr and IIRIRA) only to address
176

Sol v. INS, 274 F.3d 648, 651 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the scope of habeas review

does not extend to review of the immigration service’s discretionary determinations,
including whether administrative decisions lack adequate support from the record, which
would involve a reconsideration of evidence).
177

Bakhtriger v. Elwood, 360 F.3d 414, 420-21 (3d Cir. 2004) (reasoning that the scope

of habeas review that survived IIRIRA is no greater than the traditional scope of habeas
review, which did not include review of discretionary acts).
178

Bowrin v. US INS, 194 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 1999). In this pre-St. Cyr decision, the

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reached the conclusion ultimately reached by the
Supreme Court in St. Cyr—that habeas jurisdiction survived IIRIRA. Id. at 488-89. The
court further stated that the habeas jurisdiction that survived IIRIRA was not broad
enough to encompass review of factual or discretionary issues. Id. at 490.
179

Bravo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 590, 592-93 (5th Cir. 2003) (affirming the district court’s

determination that habeas jurisdiction does not allow review of an immigration judge’s
discretionary determination that a United States citizen child would not suffer extreme
hardship if deported with his parents).
180

Gutierrez-Chavez v. INS, 298 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 2002). In Guitierrez-Chavez, the

Ninth Circuit held that habeas review is not available to examine the “equitable balance”
reached by the immigration service in determining whether a foreign national is entitled
to relief from removal. Id. at 829. The court also stated, however, that jurisdiction could
lie under 8 U.S.C. § 2241 to review a claim that an impermissible process was employed
in reaching a discretionary decision. Id. at 829.
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constitutional and statutory issues, and not to challenge discretionary determinations.
These courts of appeals have sanctioned the use of habeas jurisdiction to address pure
questions of law, including constitutional and statutory challenges, but have refused to
allow habeas jurisdiction to encompass review of whether administrative decisions in a
particular case amount to an abuse of discretion or to challenge underlying factual
determinations.182 A few courts, however, have held that review of constitutional or
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Cadet v. Bulger, ___ F.3d ___, No. 03-14565, 2004 WL 1615619 at *8 (11th Cir. July

20, 2004) (recognizing that no court of appeals has ruled that review of discretionary acts
is appropriate via habeas jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held
that the “scope of habeas review available in § 2241 petitions by aliens challenging
removal orders (1) includes constitutional issues and errors of law, including both
statutory interpretations and application of law to undisputed or adjudicated facts, and (2)
does not include review of administrative fact findings or the exercise of discretion”).
182

See, e.g., Bakhtriger v. Elwood, 360 F.3d 414, 420 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that

“habeas proceedings do not embrace review of the exercise of discretion, or the
sufficiency of the evidence.” For an argument that habeas review may properly
encompass review of discretionary acts, see Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty, supra note 2,
at 2503-05. A related issue is whether habeas jurisdiction is appropriate to review a
discretionary act that is guided by a statutory framework. For example, in an unpublished
opinion, the Third Circuit determined that habeas jurisdiction allows review an
immigration-related discretionary act subject to statutory limits. Togbah v. Ashcroft, No.
03-1753, 2004 WL 1530494 at *1 n.1 (3d Cir. July 8, 2004) (citing Spencer Enterprises,
Inc. v. United States, 345 F.3d 683, 690 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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statutory issues includes review of whether law was applied correctly to undisputed
facts.183 The restriction of habeas review to statutory and constitutional issues is
probably not debilitating to pattern and practice cases, as such actions are likely to
present statutory and constitutional challenges. For example, the plaintiff class in Haitian
Refugee Center v. Smith raised constitutional challenges.
In summary, obtaining class-wide injunctive relief in a habeas class action
(assuming, of course, that section 1252(f)(1) bars such relief in a non-habeas action and
also assuming that the class succeeds on the merits) faces many hurdles, including: (1)
satisfying the “in custody” requirement; (2) obtaining a determination that the proper
custodian is an official who has custody over enough foreign nationals to make any classwide injunction effective; (3) winning the district court’s agreement that the class action
device should be imported to the particular habeas case; (4) satisfying the requirements
imposed by the district court judge (likely borrowed from Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23) and (5) presenting claims reviewable in a habeas action.
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Ogbudimkpa v. Ashcroft, 342 F.3d 207, 222 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that habeas

review is permissible where a petitioner claims that a law is wrongly applied in an
immigration administrative proceeding); Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 142-43 (2d
Cir. 2003) (determining that the “Constitution requires habeas review to extend to claims
of erroneous application or interpretation of statutes,” and holding that habeas review is
proper over a claim that the Board of Immigration Appeals wrongly applied the
Convention Against Torture to the facts of a case); see also Cadet v. Bulger, 2004 WL
1615619 at *8.
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VI.

Conclusion
As the above illustrates, the availability of class-wide injunctive relief in the

immigration context is currently uncertain. The source of the uncertainty, 8 U.S.C. §
1252(f)(1), upon close review, is self-limiting in several ways. Courts may fairly
interpret the statute to limit injunctive relief against the operation of limited statutory
provisions, but injunctive relief is not against the operation of those provisions if it seeks
to correct the way the immigration service is implementing those provisions. Close
review of the section also reveals that the assumption that Congress expressly intended
the section to restrict the use of the class action device in the immigration context may be
incorrect. If, however, the statute is interpreted to broadly bar class-wide injunctive
relief, habeas jurisdiction is a problematic alternative method to obtain that relief.
Remembering the injunction issued in response to the experience of the asylum
applicants in Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, this article ends with the question posed
earlier: What if the federal courts had no power to issue such class-wide relief? What if
the federal courts could not issue class-wide injunctive relief ordering the immigration
service to stop or to correct unconstitutional practices or procedures? This article
reserves the question of the constitutionality of section 1252(f)(1) in favor of focusing on
the meaning and effect of the section. The Supreme Court’s future interpretation of this
specific section, especially if the Court interprets the section as broadly barring the
federal courts from issuing class-wide injunctive relief in immigration cases, may reignite the more general debate addressing congressional power to limit federal court
jurisdiction. The resolution of the meaning and effect of section 1252(f)(1) will certainly
establish precedent that will permanently affect that debate.
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